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Purpose of Study
Due to an increase in global competition and employee dishonesty, the need 
for information security is on the rise. Consequently the XYZ Engineering Center 
faces an ever-increasing threat o f industrial espionage and information theft. 
Employees o f the Center have been given the product-security policy and have been 
encouraged to secure confidential information. Therefore, this study was designed to 
determine the level at which employees at the XYZ Engineering Center understand, 
value, and practice information security. Additionally, the study also examined 
employee views on physical safety while at work.
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Methodology
The study used analysis o f variance and a two-sample f-test to statistically 
analyze the survey results. Quantitative data were collected by use o f a questionnaire 
that was developed by the researcher. The questionnaire was distributed to 395 
employees and was completed by 189. A number o f hypotheses were developed to 
examine the relationship between employees’ understanding, valuing, and practicing 
information security and their length of service with the company, their employment 
status, and time in their current position.
This study revealed that employees with 5 or less years of service appeared 
not to value, understand, or practice information security as much as employees with 
more time on the job. Additionally, the study found that contract employees appeared 
to be less concerned about information security than salaried employees. With regard 
to physical safety, all employees reported feeling safe at work.
Conclusion
The results o f this study indicate that there is a need for XYZ Engineering 
Center to place emphasis on working with employees to assure that compliance to 
security polices is met. While there is need for continued education for all 
employees, special attention should be given to employees with fewer years of 
service.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Due to an increase in global competition and employee dishonesty, the need 
for security within the industrial world is on the rise. This increase in global 
competition is most notably characterized by the rapid increase o f Internet hosts 
across the world. In January 1995, there were only 5.8 million Internet hosts 
worldwide. This figure escalated to 43.2 million by January 1998 (Ryan, 2000). This 
jump in Internet hosts is a clear indication of market forces. The drive to be first to 
market a product may motivate the competition to do whatever it takes in order to 
gain an edge over the competition, including the use of unethical practices.
The theft o f proprietary information, both internally and externally, remains a 
serious problem for businesses in the United States (Littlejohn, 1994). According to 
the author of Corporate Espionage, U.S. businesses lose $100 billion a year to 
industrial spying (Winkler, 1997). While measuring the impact o f espionage in the 
high-tech industry is not an exact science, the FBI reported that the underground 
exchange o f information is raging in dot-com hot spots, such as the Silicon Valley in 
California (Marrs, 2000). In the high-tech world, the theft o f information is even 
more advanced than in traditional industries. It is rampant. In some ways, it is part of 
doing business. Experts say hacking, cheating, and stealing information for material
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
gains are natural consequences of an economy that relies heavily on technology and 
the Internet (Winkler, 1997, p. 18).
Competition is fierce. The availability o f skilled laborers has declined, and 
information is gold. Even traditional corporations are targets, as more companies rely 
on the Internet for business operations like purchasing and sales (Sorid, 2000). 
Industrial sleuthing can gamer all kinds o f information, such as the competition’s 
plans for new products, sales, and price strategies; industrial sleuthing can also 
ascertain a rival company’s degree o f interest in new technologies (Fleming, 1992).
Rothke (2001) defines espionage as the collection, collation, and analysis of 
illicitly gained information. In the case o f industrial espionage, the perpetrator’s most 
common objectives are as follows:
1. To determine a competitor’s activities with regard to new products
2. To determine formulations
3. To determine areas o f interest for future research
4. To determine production methodology
5. To determine production quantities
6 . To determine promotional programs
7. To determine distribution o f products
8 . To determine economics (Rothke, 2001).
Corporate espionage is also used to examine products or ingredients for 
perceived or actual risks, to time markets, and to establish pricing. It is all too 
common for companies to find themselves the targets o f such activity. Frequently, a
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company will not have the knowledge or methodology to effectively countermand 
information theft.
Knowledge will become more powerful as the world moves toward a more 
information-driven society, which values the trading and brokering of information. 
Knowledge theft is becoming an increasingly important and influential crime, one 
that has become increasingly difficult to combat (Rothke, 2001). Comprehensive 
policies concerning the prevention o f corporate espionage and the maintenance of 
product security will help hundreds o f companies to remain competitive.
According to Ryan (2000), infiltrators use a number of different techniques to 
get the information they want to leak out of an organization, the most basic o f which 
is taking copies. The continual and rapid technological advances made over the past 
several decades pose another significant challenge to individuals responsible for 
information security. Computers play an increasingly more significant role in the 
processing and storing of information. Thus, developing a computer security policy 
is the first step in improving business security posture. Once a comprehensive 
security policy is defined with a computer/network security standard, a policy can be 
implemented through a number o f mechanisms (Hartley, 1998).
The cost o f industrial espionage is staggering. Nearly 50% of the Fortune 
1000 companies and the 300 fastest-growing companies, which responded to a 1999 
survey, reported suspecting intellectual property losses, but were unable to document 
them (Lipman, 2000). Potential losses from intellectual property theft for U.S.-based 
companies may exceed $250 billion annually. It is estimated that Fortune 1000
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
companies lost $45 billion from proprietary information theft in 1999 (Lipman, 
2000).
Information targeted for theft includes customer lists, sales figures, research 
and development information, manufacturing and market plans or anything a 
competitor could use to gain an advantage. According to the above-cited survey, 
individuals who are most likely to commit proprietary information theft are former 
employees, temporary staff, current employees, suppliers and consultants (Lipman, 
2000). High technology companies are most frequently targeted, followed by those 
companies in the manufacturing and service industries.
Automotive manufacturers are taking steps to educate employees on the need 
to be aware o f securing confidential information. Citing the sensitive nature of the 
topic, Ford Motor Company refuses to comment on the company’s plans to evaluate 
and upgrade its security (Kisiel, 2001). However, information obtained from 
DaimlerChrysler’s security manual states the following procedures regarding its 
policies relating to information security:
1. All information classified as confidential must be permanently marked 
CONFIDENTIAL.
2. Never reproduce a document marked CONFIDENTIAL unless properly 
authorized.
3. When mailing a confidential document, place it in a sealed envelope, 
which is permanently marked CONFIDENTIAL. Note: Whenever possible, sensitive 
and confidential documents should be hand carried to the recipient.
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3. All confidential documents not in use should be stored in a locked file 
container or desk.
4. Shred all drafts and extra copies of confidential documents 
(DaimlerChrysler, 2001, Section 4.9.3).
XYZ Engineering Center
This study focuses on YXZ Engineering Center, a pseudonym for an actual 
manufacturing company. Like most manufacturers, XYZ Engineering has an 
information and product security policy that employees are expected to follow. The 
policy outlines the company’s expectation that employees will secure information that 
is deemed confidential. (Chapter 2 explores this policy further.) XYZ also has a 
network security policy.
Permission to examine the policies and practices o f the corporation was 
granted on the condition that name would not be used due to security concerns. 
Employee names referenced in this research have also been changed.
XYZ Engineering Center, a multi-national company located in the 
Midwestern United States, has the responsibility o f designing and testing engines and 
engine parts. Due to the rigorous testing protocols required by federal standards, it 
typically takes 4 to 5 years to move an engine or a part from the design and test 
phases to its release for mass production. It is not uncommon to see blueprints of 
parts that are not slated for production for 4 years or more. In addition to this, many 
physical parts are tested that may or may not eventually make it to production. These 
“experimental” parts are consistently being tested and evaluated.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Many companies, including XYZ Engineering Center, use electronic means to 
store and share sensitive information. XYZ handles sensitive material in the form of 
drawings and designs of advanced model-year parts along with the results o f tests 
conducted on experimental engines. These highly sensitive data are stored in a 
variety o f forms, including electronic storage. (The loss o f this information to 
competitors could cost the company a tremendous amount o f money and have a 
serious impact on its future.)
All information contained in XYZ Engineering Center’s files is proprietary. 
An Information Security Risk Analysis should be performed annually to determine 
what information should be considered “classified” (Confidential or Secret) based on 
Information Security guidelines. Periodic departmental audits (test checking) will 
clearly determine compliance to procedures and if  compliance needs to be 
strengthened. Any non-compliance noted must be addressed immediately and all 
employees are instructed to ensure compliance. It is each employee’s responsibility 
to follow information security policies set forth by the company. According to the 
XYZ Corporate Security Manual, the following are recommendations that employees 
should adhere to:
1. All employees must have their corporate IDs worn and visible at all times. 
In addition, all employees should challenge any non-department employees or visitors 
wandering in their area.
2. Ensure personal computer logoff (or password protection) takes place 
during short absences.
3. Keys should not be left in files or desks.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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4. Secure all classified information when away from the office. The securing 
of classified information must be in existence even though approved levels of 
restricted access are in effect after-hours (i.e., the building and office are both locked 
with limited key access to these areas). Perimeter gate security alone is not 
considered “restricted” enough.
5. Individual lockable office doors are considered a restricted access security 
device. Office door keys should be controlled. The same key should open multiple 
doors.
6. When away from the desk or office (even if  for a short time), classified 
information should be secured. A clean desktop should be mandatory during 
extended periods away from the office or desk.
7. Reduce the number of hard copies. Hard copy documents should not be 
maintained if  electronic copies are readily available. Ensure all electronic data are 
protected.
8. The release o f XYZ Engineering Center information, especially outside 
the business unit, requires proper management approval. Grant access to any XYZ 
information on a “need-to-know-only” basis.
9. Individual departments within XYZ Engineering Center should complete 
and test contingency plans according to company guidelines in case o f a disaster.
Disaster preparedness and physical safety o f employees are areas of vital 
concern to all businesses. Since the September 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade 
Towers and the Pentagon, companies are taking a closer look at the security and 
physical safety of their employees. Those events are grave reminders o f the potential
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disasters that corporate America faces. Companies must make every reasonable 
effort to assure the safety o f their employees while they are at work.
Statement of the Problem
Only 63% of the Fortune 1000 and 300 fastest-growing companies surveyed 
have formal programs to safeguard proprietary information. O f this group, only 51% 
think the security programs have been uniformly implemented throughout their 
respective companies (Lipman, 2000).
To some degree, virtually all employees and managers at the XYZ 
Engineering Center have been exposed to information and product security policies. 
Most of this exposure has consisted o f notices placed on bulletin boards, memos, an 
occasional “form letter” reminding employees to display identification badges, or a 
voice mail distribution reminding employees to lock restricted or confidential 
material in desks before going home.
Recent memos from the company’s security office have been issued to all 
users o f laptop computers, asking employees to use company-issued locks. The 
memos advise employees to securely lock their laptops on their desktop while away 
from their desks. Several incidents o f laptop computer theft have been reported to the 
security officials. Few companies are prepared to prevent the loss o f confidential 
information. Manufacturers, in particular, risk theft of trade secrets to internal 
thieves, including employees and former staff, contract employees, and suppliers. 
According to a recent survey of large companies by the American Society of 
Industrial Security, over 50% of the companies responded that they have lost 
important information deemed classified and confidential (Gale Group, 2000).
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Although there are no reported cases of information theft to date at XYZ Engineering 
Center, the potential for such an act is a real possibility.
The likelihood o f an incident involving a case of industrial espionage within 
this organization is a reality. The ever-present competition for market share, by 
companies who may not have the same ethical values of XYZ Engineering, poses a 
threat that could increase the possibility o f such an act. Having an educated 
workforce in place that practices the company’s security procedures will help to 
protect the vital information at XYZ Engineering Center.
With the heightened level of security in our nation the researcher believes this 
has changed the way people view their own safety. However, employees in 
businesses are more concerned about an attack by a disgruntled or former employee. 
With continued downsizing and massive layoffs in the industry, the threat o f an attack 
by a former employee becomes an even greater concern for employee safety.
XYZ Engineering has taken steps to protect employees while they are at work. 
Has the company done enough to make employees “feel safe”? A few steps that the 
company has taken include closing visitor-parking areas that are adjacent to the main 
lobby. The intent o f this action is to prevent the potential for a car bomb to be left in 
the area. XYZ has also increased patrols o f parking lots by security personnel. No 
one hopes we will have to find out whether these steps are adequate.
Purpose of the Study
This study has a two-fold purpose. First, the study examined the level to 
which salaried and contract employees understand and follow corporate guidelines 
related to information and product security, along with the value they place on its
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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importance at XYZ Engineering Center. Second, the study examined employees’ 
perception o f their own personal safety at work.
Research Questions
This research study was designed to address the following questions:
Question 1: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center understand the 
information security guidelines as set forth by the corporation?
Question 2: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center value information 
security?
Question 3: Do employees at the XYZ Engineering Center practice corporate 
guidelines related to information security?
Question 4: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center feel safe from physical 
harm while at work?
Significance of the Study
Currently, XYZ Engineering Center’s upper-level managers are placing much 
emphasis on information security. The degree to which employees understand, value, 
and practice security habits has significant ramifications for the company. Failure by 
employees to consistently follow the policy’s guidelines could cost the company 
billions o f dollars in lost revenue. In addition, the countless man-hours spent in the 
design, development, testing, and production o f future engines and engine-parts 
would be lost. Such a loss would have staggering repercussions not only for the 
corporation’s present place in the global market, but for its future as well.
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With the diverse workforce at XYZ Engineering Center, hypotheses were 
developed based on demographics. The demographics chosen included length of 
service, time in current position, contract employee vs. salary employee, and 
technical vs. non-technical. The research questions were designed to determine the 
level of employee understanding and value o f the corporate policy, employee attitude 
toward physical safety, and employee understanding and following guidelines.
The results o f this study will provide insight into the employees’ attitudes and 
understanding of the corporation’s policy regarding securing sensitive data. The 
research study may serve as a vehicle for helping the company to examine its current 
policy relevant to today’s needs.
Setting
This study took place at the XYZ Engineering Center. It is the responsibility 
o f this facility to design, test, and validate engine and engine components for all of 
XYZ Corporation. Located in the Midwest, the Engineering Center consists o f four 
floors of office space, along with a shop area where extensive testing on experimental 
engines is conducted. The building has five entrances. O f these five, two have a 
security officer checking identification badges and monitoring foot traffic in and out 
o f the building. The other three are operated by “card-reader” access. An employee 
with a valid identification badge swipes his or her badge through the card reader.
This process allows restricted access to qualified individuals only.
Approximately 500 employees work at XYZ Engineering Center. O f this 
population 100 or 20% are hourly, 260 or 52% are salaried, and 140 or 28% are 
contract employees. The salaried, technical employees consist o f engineers,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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information systems analysts, and engineer technicians, while all the technology 
skilled-trade laborers are paid an hourly wage. All non-technical staff (which are the 
janitorial services, some administrative positions, as well as those individuals who 
work in the shipping and receiving department) are hourly wage earners. The non­
technical salary/contract employees consist o f all administration support functions, 
purchasing functions, pre-production manufacturing functions, as well as various 
engineering support functions.
XYZ Engineering Center is in a battle to stay on top in the automobile 
industry. To continue to remain competitive, it must do everything possible to protect 
its assets. John Doe, CEO of XYZ Engineering Center, emphasizes, “All employees 
need to be vigilant and compliant to standards set forth in the XYZ Corporate 
Security Manual” (Doe, 2001).
The May 2001 Global Security Vigilance briefing that was presented by XYZ 
Global Security for all employees of XYZ Engineering stressed that “both physical 
and information security is everyone’s responsibility” (2001). These briefings were 
conducted in several sessions that trained employees to be observant o f their 
surroundings and report any o f the following conditions:
1. Suspicious packages, boxes, etc., in their work area
2. Any suspicious individuals
3. Persons taking photographs or video of the facility
4. Persons appearing to be unfamiliar with the facility
5. Unescorted visitors in the building, especially in restricted areas
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The presentation went on to educate employees on how to be vigilant by 
adhering to some basic rules:
1. Report lost keys, access cards, or identification badges promptly to 
security.
2. Report conditions that impact security at the facility such as holes in 
perimeter fences and normal secured doors or gates found unlocked.
3. Report security violations such as material deemed confidential (i.e., 
drawings of advance designs), computer disks left unsecured, and laptop computer 
left unattended.
The presentation also asked employees to help control access by supporting 
security in the following areas:
1. Be patient with inbound and outbound package inspection that is designed 
to support safety.
2. Each person should use his or her own access card through automated 
entrances.
3. Politely deny access to others if  they are not known to you.
Finally, the presentation stressed that security is everyone’s responsibility.
All employees should observe and report suspicious activities to team leaders, facility 
management, or local security departments.
In an effort to remain competitive, all employees need to practice better 
security habits and pay closer attention to their surroundings. “It is the responsibility 
o f all employees to protect XYZ’s assets, as well as, the first and overriding
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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responsibility which is the safety and security o f XYZ’s most important asset, its 
people” (Doe, 2001).
Delimitations and Limitations of the Study
1. This research study was limited to employees at XYZ Engineering Center.
2. The questionnaire was distributed to the salaried and long-term contracted 
employees who are listed in the official telephone directory, dated September 2002.
3. Only those employees who completed the survey in its entirety were 
utilized in this study.
4. Because of limited exposure and access to confidential information, hourly 
employees were excluded from this survey.
5. Due to the sensitive nature o f this topic, the researcher was not able to use 
the actual name of the company or real names o f employees, which are the focus of 
this study. Both XYZ Engineering Center and John Doe are pseudonyms.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is derived from Martin Fishbein’s 
Theory of Reasoned Action. Fishbein is one of the best known and respected 
information-integration theorists (Littlejohn, 2002). The theory holds that a person‘s 
behavioral intentions are a function of two different factors. The first factor is 
attitude toward the behavior, which Randall (1989) defined as the product o f one’s 
salient belief that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes and an 
evaluation o f the outcomes, i.e., rating o f the desirability o f the outcome. The second 
factor is subjective norm, which is a function o f the product o f one’s normative belief
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which is the person’s belief that the salient referent thinks he should (or should not) 
perform the behavior, and his/her motivation to comply with that referent (Randall, 
1989).
This theory provides a framework to study attitudes toward behaviors. 
According to the theory, the most important determinant o f a person’s behavior is 
intent. The individual’s intention to perform a behavior is a combination o f attitude 
toward performing the behavior and subjective norm. The individual’s attitude 
toward the behavior includes behavioral belief, evaluations o f behavioral outcome, 
subjective norm, normative beliefs, and the motivation to comply.
If a person perceives the outcome from performing a behavior is positive, 
he/she will have a positive attitude toward performing that behavior. The opposite 
can also be stated if  the behavior is thought to be negative. If relevant others see 
performing the behavior as positive and the individual is motivated to meet the 
expectations of relevant others, then a positive subjective norm is expected. If 
relevant others see the behavior as negative, and the individual wants to meet the 
expectations o f these “others,” then the experience is likely to be a negative 
subjective norm for the individual (Cooper, 2001).
Fishbein’s (1975) theory said that a personal factor and a social factor were 
the two components that determined behavior intentions. According to the theory, 
intentions are a result o f the persons’ judgement that performing the behavior is good. 
The person’s attitude toward the behavior plus the social pressure put on him to 
perform the behavior, or the subjective norm, is the key. To give an example, an 
employee may desire to practice the security guideline that relates to wearing their ID
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badge. The policy states that employees are expected to display their ID badge at all 
times. Although an employee may endorse the practice o f wearing their badge, they 
may make the decision not to wear their badge, based on peer pressure from their 
group, or the subjective norm.
The intent o f this research directly correlates to Fishbein’s Theory o f 
Reasoned Action. Employees will be grouped and analyzed, in an effort to determine 
if  attitudes and behaviors, as they relate to information security, provide insight into 






Defined as moving all classified 
(Confidential and Secret) documents and 
data (diskettes/files) from desktops/tables 
to locked desks/files during extended 
periods away from the office or desk. 
Employed by independent companies who 
contract their services to XYZ.
The practice o f spying on ones’ competitor 
in an effort to gain technical knowledge of 
their products.
Employees who are represented by the 
United Autoworkers Union (UAW) and are 
paid for only the hours they work.
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Information and Product Security 
Policy: 
Internet Host:






The official, written policy regarding 
information security at XYZ.
An electronic communications network 
used by companies including XYZ, which 
connects computer networks worldwide. 
Computer system that exclusively services 
XYZ.
The electronic mail system used throughout 
the company to communicate information 
to employees.
An employee o f XYZ Engineering Center 
whose job classification is considered non­
technical in nature. XYZ Management 
makes this determination along with the 
Human Resource department.
The boundary line or the area immediately 
inside the boundary passageway (as in a 
building/facility) where employees can 
enter or exit the premises.
Author of the study.
Employees o f XYZ who are not 
represented by the United Autoworkers.
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Deliberate destruction o f an employer’s 
property or hindering o f production by 
workers.
An employee of XYZ Engineering Center 
whose job classification is considered 
technical in nature. XYZ Management 
makes this determination along with the 
Human Resource department.
A telephone messaging system that most 
salary employees are part of, which allows 
the distribution o f information to be passed 
via telephone.
Organization of the Study
In chapter 1 ,1 introduce the study’s problem and discuss its background. 
Additionally, I state the research problem, outline the purpose o f the study, list the 
research questions, and explain the setting o f the problem. In addition, I indicate the 
significance of the study, identify the delimitations and limitations o f the study, and 
provide a definition o f terms.
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the relevant literature and 
includes a discussion o f the following topics: the history of security, types of 
information theft, the security measures used in today’s industry, employee behaviors 
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Chapter 3 addresses the study’s research design, including population and 
sample, variables and measures, procedures, and data analysis methods.
Chapter 4 presents the study’s results, description of the sample population, 
and hypotheses analysis.
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the literature, methodology, findings, 
discussion, and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Within this chapter I provide a review o f the literature as it relates to information 
security. A brief history o f the evolution o f private security in the United States is 
discussed. Additionally I discuss the various types o f corporate espionage along with 
different strategies currently used to battle information theft. Employee behavior and 
attitudes toward security and the cost o f utilizing contract workers will be discussed. 
Information on the issue o f workplace violence with regard to the impact it has on both 
employees and employers is provided. Finally, a detailed explanation o f the XYZ 
information security policies and procedures, along with the XYZ policy on workplace 
violence, is provided.
Background to Security
Private security in America has its origins in the second half o f the 19th century. 
Green (1985) states, “The slow development o f public law enforcement, combined with 
the steady escalation o f crime in an industrialized society, created security needs which 
were met by what could be considered the first professional private security organization 
in America” (p.68). In the 1850s, Allan Pinkerton established one o f the oldest, and 
currently the largest, private security operations in the United States. Brinks, 
Incorporated, was founded by Washington Perry Brink in 1859 as a freight delivery
20
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service. More than 30 years later, in 1891, Brink transported his first payroll, marking 
the beginning of the armored car courier service (Green, 1985).
During World War I, fears over industrial sabotage and espionage gave brief 
impetus to private security enforcement. This slackened during the years between the 
First and Second World Wars. With the start o f World War II, the need for industrial 
security increased. The end of the war saw more than 200,000 men and women had 
sworn as security personnel (Green, 1985).
The power politics o f the Cold War years continued to emphasize the need for 
sophisticated security measures. Initially, there was an increased interest in protecting 
the nation against acts o f sabotage and the theft of classified information. However, the 
steady increase in crimes of violence, as well as crimes against property, continued to 
direct more attention to the need for private security (Green, 1985).
With the end o f the Cold War, nations used spies to focus on technology theft 
rather than trying to gain military advantage. The protection o f company secrets is 
crucial (O’Connell, 1994). Whether it is war between two countries, something as simple 
as a sporting event, or two companies competing for the same business, history has 
shown that having a distinct edge on the competition is crucial to survival and success. 
Knowing what the competition is up to is a vital part o f doing business (Taylor, 2001).
Types of Information Theft
Discovering a competitor’s plans and trade secrets can occur through either 
“competitive intelligence” or corporate espionage. Miller, a spokesman for the Society of 
Competitive Intelligence Professionals, defines competitive intelligence as “the legal and
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ethical collection and analysis o f information about the competitive environment” 
(Rothke, 2001, p.6). This can be illustrated by the practice o f a company purchasing a 
competitor’s product for the express purpose o f dismantling it in order to learn about its 
manufacturing process.
Corporate espionage, on the other hand, “implies the theft o f  trade secrets, which 
is both illegal and unethical” (Taylor, 2001, p.37). A disgruntled employee selling 
proprietary information to a company’s competitor demonstrates this concept. Theft of 
company secrets may occur through two of the most common types o f corporate 
espionage—economic/industrial sabotage and electronic theft.
Economic and Industrial Espionage
Economic espionage presents a significant threat to U.S. industries. Many foreign 
countries seek to acquire critical technologies for military and commercial applications, 
and the United States is a tempting target. Corporate America leads in the development 
of cutting-edge technical and scientific innovations. In addition, the United States is 
characterized by an open and free society where information is easily accessible and 
legally available. In the new, global environment, an espionage attack on a U.S. 
corporation can come from at least three directions.
The first is the entrepreneurial spy, the employee who steals proprietary 
information and trade secrets with the specific intent o f selling those secrets to the highest 
bidder. Second, global competitors can mount an attack in order to weaken the position 
of the corporation in the world market. A third avenue o f attack can come from the 
professional intelligence services o f governments that seek economic information to 
bolster the competitive edge of their national corporations (O’Connell, 1994). Foreign
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intelligence services are expanding the focus o f operations from gathering military 
secrets to collecting economic intelligence (O’Connell, 1994).
The decline o f communism, the fall o f the Berlin Wall, and the current disfavor of 
the feared and famed KGB suggest that companies have little to fear from espionage. 
However, as former foes o f the United States embrace capitalism and seek new markets, 
the expertise gained through years o f military espionage will be easily converted to 
economic espionage (Goodboe, 1992).
As stated earlier, with the end o f the Cold War and the emergence o f a new global 
economy, American companies face an increased threat from corporations’ abroad, which 
seek to gain information through illegal means. Spies are now targeting businesses 
(Kleist, 1994). According to Kleist, incidences o f the theft o f industrial secrets have 
increased 260% since 1985.
“Industrial spying on American firms is not limited to countries that are not 
friendly to the United States”(Koshel, 1993, p67). Koshel (1993), further points out that 
industrial espionage operations are being carried out against the United States by 
countries normally identified as allies, including the nations o f Japan, Germany, France, 
Israel, and South Korea.
Koshel (1993) further states that these are not simple industrial thefts. These 
espionage activities are extremely sophisticated and well-orchestrated operations, which 
occur with the full faith and financial commitment o f the foreign governments and their 
intelligence organizations.
This assertion was powerfully illustrated when agents working for the United 
States uncovered individuals whom the French intelligence service had recruited as spies.
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These industrial covert operators had been placed in the European branches of IBM,
Texas Instruments, and other U.S. electronics companies. The spy ring’s objective was 
to pass marketing and research information to a computer company owned by the French 
government (Stedman, 1991).
In addition to the loss o f intellectual assets, the theft o f physical property or 
inventory continues to plague companies. In 2002, it is estimated that U.S. business 
losses could reach as high as $150 billion. According to the U.S. Chamber o f Commerce, 
employee theft costs employers $40 billion a year, and theft causes one-third o f all 
business bankruptcies (Lippman, 2000). Further Lippman states that researchers under 
contract to the FBI developed a way to assess loss from theft o f intellectual property. In 
one case, a foreign competitor stole secrets from a U.S. corporation and, as a result, 
captured the market. The researchers calculated $600 million in lost sales; this was in 
addition to the loss o f 2,600 jobs (Lipman, 2000).
Electronic Theft
The advent of personal computers and the Internet has ushered in a new and more 
complex threat to corporate security—the computer information broker. The widespread 
use o f technology means that corporate data security officers should be extra vigilant 
about protecting personnel and customer records (Betts, 1992). Information o f a 
confidential nature should not be stored on a computer’s hard-drive. Ubois (1993) states 
that correspondence should be saved on floppy discs that can be kept with an individual. 
If  the computer has a security device, the computer terminal should be locked and the key 
taken when an individual leaves.
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Ubois (1993), goes on to say: “Computer information brokers hire dumpster 
drivers, computer hackers or insiders to gain illegal access to highly marketable 
information”(p. 19). When such an illegal or unauthorized intrusion occurs, managers 
want security tightened immediately, if  not sooner. Keeping records and informing 
managers o f breaches in electronic security may not be enough to sufficiently raise the 
awareness o f managers for the need to implement effective electronic security measures 
(Ubois, 1993).
Jensen (2000) states that raising a manager’s awareness to the importance o f 
establishing security measures is achievable. Raising this awareness, however, can pose 
a significant challenge for corporate security officers. Since managers are more likely to 
look at profit margins and the bottom line, allocating resources to ensure a company’s 
computer network is secure can be career-limiting (Jensen, 2000).
While deluged with information that describes exploits and explains security 
strategies, security officers find little advice on how to navigate corporate corridors; how 
to engage management in the creation o f a security program; how to publish policies; or 
how to obtain resources for security in an unaware corporate environment. The real 
security challenge may be cultural and organizational, not technical (Jensen, 2000).
Time and money are still the two main drawbacks to making security tighter, 
according to an Information Week security survey. It appears that training has increased; 
technology is less complex (Eckhouse, 2002). The shortage of qualified security staff has 
eased and management support and departmental cooperation are up. But more than a 
quarter o f the companies have not taken any steps to integrate information security and 
physical security operations. Blocking unauthorized access and refining security
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architecture rank as the other top priorities. Getting management buy-in and funding do 
not rank high, possibly because they have already been accomplished. There is an urgent 
need to measure and review information security policy on a regular basis. It should 
include (Eckhouse, 2002):
1. Network and system administration security procedures
2. Policies on data protection, disclosure, and destruction
3. Explaining to all employees the appropriate use o f E-mail and the Web.
Effective security is not a revenue-producing activity and, as such, has no visible
impact on a company’s profit margin. Executives in many organizations still operate in a 
state o f denial. These executives are naively unwilling to assess network security. The 
executive focus remains entirely on profits and revenues (Jensen, 2000).
However, failure to adequately protect a company’s proprietary information can 
have devastating financial repercussions. The Computer Security Institute/FBI Computer 
Crime and Security Survey reveals electronic attacks resulted in $266 million in losses at 
272 U.S. organizations during the year 2000 (Jensen, 2000).
While the exigencies o f E-commerce require the Internet to be safe and secure, 
various surveys such as Ernst and Young (2002) reveal that 75% o f companies reported 
computer security breaches in the past year. As adoption and dependence on the Internet 
grows, concerns over security and associated issues continue to be listed as a top 
challenge, hindering the multi-billion dollar corporation. In addition to the growth o f E- 
commerce, several significant changes driven by the forces o f globalization and the 
regulatory environmental make information security an even greater area o f concern.
One example, is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA, 1996).
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Acting out o f concern for protecting the confidentiality o f private health information, this 
law was designed to ensure that public and private health organizations handle health 
information appropriately. In part these standards were designed to improve efficiently 
and protect the security and confidentiality o f electronic health information (Garg, 2003).
Another law designed for protection, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA, 2000), applies to the online collection o f personal information from children 
under age 13. This rule spells out what a Web site operator must include in a privacy 
policy, when and how to seek verifiable consent from a parent, and what responsibilities 
an operator has to protect children’s privacy and safety online. If  a commercial Web site 
or an online service is directed to children under 13 that collects personal information 
from children or operates a general audience Web site and has actual knowledge that they 
are collecting personal information from children, they must comply with the Children’s 
Online Privacy Act (Garg, 2003).
In the early phase o f the growth o f the Internet (1996-2000), hack attacks were 
intermittent and did not receive a great deal o f attention in the financial press. This all 
changed in February o f 2000. In February 2000, a series of well-orchestrated distributed 
denial o f service (DDoS) attacks occurred that permanently changed the public 
perception o f Internet attacks. The affected companies were some o f the biggest icons of 
the Internet, such as Amazon, Yahoo, and eBay. Unlike earlier breached parties, these 
companies that were attacked relied solely on the Internet for business. The first in the 
series o f attacks occurred on February 7, 2000, when Yahoo suffered a deluge o f service 
requests, a magnitude greater than its normal volume in the span of seconds, in effect 
crippling the site. The following day, February 8, Buy.com, eBay, CNN, MSN, and
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Amazon were all attacked in a similar maimer. Buy.com was making its IPO debut, 
when its Web site crashed due to denial o f service attack. To conclude the series on
■t
Wednesday, February 9, the Web site o f  ZDnet, E*Trade, and Bxcited@Home were 
attacked and rendered out o f commission for the day (Garg, 2003).
According to many industry observers, as results indicate, the wave ofDoS 
(denial o f service) attacks in 2000, the first to pop up on the radar screen of the business 
community, served as a wake-up call to both technology-reliant companies and investors 
with clear implications for cyber-risk management. These attacks showed the true 
vulnerabilities o f the Internet and heightened awareness o f the financial implicates o f 
security breaches, including the lost revenue due to downtime, systems recovery costs, 
and damage to brand reputation and customer perception (Garg, 2003).
Security Measures in Today’s Industries
Methods and strategies used for stealing company secrets have become more 
sophisticated. No longer do those bent on stealing secrets rummage through a company’s 
garbage bin. Taylor, head o f corporate intelligence for the investigative firm of Kroll 
Inc., relates the tale o f a student who continually clicked his pen during a tour o f an 
unnamed European company. Executives thought the student was hyperactive. In 
reality, the pen was a tiny, sophisticated camera. Three years later, the company the 
student worked for released a product based on information from photographs that were 
taken during the tour (Jensen, 2000).
Arbetter (1994) states that it is absolutely essential to open the eyes of the private 
sector to the costly dangers faced by information and proprietary theft. There are
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
solutions and answers to combating the menace o f espionage. Federal agencies are 
attempting to work with American industries to counter the espionage threat.
The former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), James Woolsey, 
has indicated a willingness to expand that agency’s activities into countering corporate 
espionage sponsored by many other countries (McDermott, 1994). The FBI’s 
Development o f Espionage, Counterintelligence, and Counter-terrorism Awareness 
(DECA) has released a videotape which demonstrates the importance o f being aware o f 
industrial espionage and how to counter it (Rothke, 2000). The tape offers information 
on a counterespionage program and strongly encourages senior management officials to 
support a strong security department, to solicit the active participation o f all employees, 
and to share information on incidences o f industrial espionage with other companies and 
government agencies.
Properly training employees fosters awareness o f  ways to detect possible 
espionage. For example, Mendell (1994), Director o f  Security at a large American 
corporation, suggests that security officers can report attempts to search the trash bins by 
outsiders. Wastebaskets can be a gold mine for memos, documents, and even financial 
plans (Falconer, 1990). Mendell goes on to say that sales staff can identify those who 
pump them for excessive company information at trade fairs. “Technical personnel can 
report overly friendly members o f the opposite sex asking too many questions about the 
company’s new product at a convention” (Mendell, 1994 p.34).
Frequent security surveys can reveal potential weaknesses and new threats 
(Mendell, 1994). Such surveys supply insight into where and how attacks may occur. If  
a manager wishes to mislead potential information thieves, security surveys can identify
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the targets most likely to attract the attention o f prospective thieves. A perceptive 
security manager analyzes the business in a non-bureaucratic way, identifying the 
pathways to plunder overlooked by rigid, bureaucratic thinking.
Counterespionage Strategies
The first step in developing a comprehensive counterespionage strategy is to
examine the nature o f the threat and the motivation o f the spy in the corporate structure.
History has shown that money, financial problems, or outright greed motivate industrial
spies. When one or more o f these motivations is coupled with the opportunity to
capitalize on access to classified information, a breach o f information security is likely to
occur (O’Connell, 1994). Most businesses possess marketable proprietary information
for which competitors will pay handsomely. Information targeted for theft exists in a
variety o f forms, such as a mailing list for an interior design firm, a law firm’s file on an
upcoming merger, or the bank records on a plumbing supplier (Mendell, 1994).
O ’Connell (1994) believes the following basic counterespionage strategies can be
applied to minimize and eliminate the threat o f espionage. According to O ’Connell,
The first step a security director should take is to obtain the understanding and 
ensure the support o f senior management. It is critical to realistically 
communicate the severity o f the threat. Overstating the nature o f the threat is the 
quickest way to lose the confidence o f senior management officials. The security 
director should analyze the potential o f real risk to the company and monitor 
current cases in the corporate counterespionage field. Periodic briefings for senior 
management officials will help ensure that management remains sensitized to the 
threat (O’Connell, 1994 p.55).
A company’s leaders must practice what they preach. A boss who waves friends 
through an entry point or fails to wear his or her identification (ID) badge sends a strong 
signal to his or her subordinates as to what is important. “What is sauce for the goose,
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must be sauce for the gander,” says a former FBI official about consistency. If senior 
management follows the rules, the message will be passed down the ranks (Lipman,
2000, p.2).
This message of security and safety should be reinforced through regular 
reminders. “I don’t care how skilled you are as a diplomat,” former Secretary of State 
Madeline Albright told colleagues, “if  you are not professional about security, you are a 
failure”(Lipman, 2000 p. 19) This warning could also apply to the corporate world. 
Leaders can change the corporate culture by being pro-active, leading by example, and by 
issuing clear directives. Implementing security procedures before a serious security 
breach occurs will reinforce the importance o f risk management and the role a company’s 
employees play in managing that risk (O’Connell, 1994).
Centralizing responsibility is another basic counterespionage strategy.
Companies tend to fragment the security responsibility along functional lines. The 
security director must convince senior management that overall responsibility for the 
counterespionage program of the company should be placed within the security 
department. Working in coordination with the other functional department heads, the 
security director should ultimately be responsible for the counterespionage program of 
the corporation. The decentralization o f responsibility destroys the synergism of the 
individual elements o f the overall strategy (O’Connell, 1994).
Working closely with senior management, the security director should focus on 
resources. The security director should also develop essential types o f  information that 
need to be protected, such as technical advances and product development schedules, as 
well as client and pricing data. The security director must ensure that counterespionage
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resources are used to protect the most critical information assets. The basic elements o f 
the strategy will be those methods and techniques needed to deter, detect, and neutralize 
an espionage attack.
Raising the risk level will deter individuals from committing an act o f espionage. 
The following actions as pointed out by O ’Connell are the most widely used 
counterintelligence protective procedures to deter espionage:
1. Randomly checking the personal belongings o f employees as they leave work
2. Controlling and restricting access to areas where sensitive data are used
3. Using need-to-know procedures for the information that has been clearly 
identified as proprietary or classified as a trade secret (O’Connell, 1994).
Routinely scheduled security awareness briefings are a necessary part of any 
deterrence strategy. These briefings should be tailored to the audience and should 
highlight the type of information the corporation considers proprietary, as well as the 
latest cases in the corporate counterespionage world that illustrate the methods 
competitors use to access and steal information.
Finally, the security director must have mechanisms in place to detect any 
individuals not dissuaded by the company’s deterrence measures. One effective 
mechanism is to establish a security hotline, where employees can anonymously report 
suspicious activity. The hotline can also be used to report incidences o f waste, fraud, and 
theft o f product and time.
Most people want to work in an environment that is secure. Employees tend to 
genuinely dislike those who openly steal from an employer. The employee who steals 
products or information from a company is ultimately hurting fellow employees, and
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most people who realize this will not hesitate to report the activity (O’Connell, 1994). 
Along with the hotline, employees should have a means of reporting directly to security 
officials any attempts by individuals to elicit proprietary information.
Additional measures to protect classified information can also be taken by 
companies before a prospective employee is hired. Himelstein (1993) points out that 
some companies have been taking precautions for years. General Dynamics, for 
example, routinely requires job seekers to sign a contract that restricts his or her use o f 
the company’s data and technology as a condition o f employment. Himelstein also 
suggests utilizing a pre-employment contract that explicitly defines what belongs to the 
employee in the area o f information before employment begins. Himelstein explains that 
employees with access to confidential information sign contracts promising not to 
disclose the data or work for a rival soon after quitting.
Stopping the employee theft o f information is difficult. Most often you have no 
idea its coming (Farley, 2003). If  you do suspect a high-level executive of such theft you 
are already somewhat late in the ballgame if  you want to give yourself the best shot at 
stopping him in his tracks. However, as Farley states, there are areas that organizations 
should consider, at a minimum, in order to prevent and possibly detect such behavior. 
Many organizations have two security-related functions: the security director (guards, 
cameras, access controls, etc.) and an information security manager (principally firewalls, 
virus controls, access controls, etc.). Often these functions are not well integrated; 
sometimes they do not even speak regularly, despite the need to be good at both, in order 
to protect the organization’s most valuable assets (Farley, 2003). Farley goes on to say, 
“Most organizations do not understand the importance that employee awareness can play
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in securing assets”(p. 44). Training of the employees especially in critical areas like 
Research and Development can alert them to common aberrant behaviors that pose risk to 
security. Information security basics such as “need to know” and “social engineering” 
can alert them to internal threats. Internal closed-circuit television (CCTV) backups and 
card access logs need to be maintained for a sufficient period. IT system access logs and 
audits trails need to be recorded and similarly maintained so you can locate the employee 
at a time and place both physically and on the IT network. Farley also cites that 
appropriate computer forensic techniques need to be applied to adequately investigate 
equipment such as laptops, desktops, and servers. The proper application o f such tools 
can provide you with evidentiary documents that were deleted (Farley, 2003).
According to the American Management Association, 82% o f American 
businesses used some form o f electronic monitoring in the past year to track their 
employees’ habits (Farley, 2003). This includes not only security cameras and card 
assess systems that monitor their movement, but Internet and e-mail monitoring systems 
that can track the flow of information. Such software can be set up on the organization’s 
mail server, simply filtering outbound and inbound traffic for key phrases such as source 
code indicative o f the organization’s most valuable asset. When detected, these e-mails 
can be blocked and quarantined for subsequent review by a member o f  the security staff. 
The key to making such monitoring tools useful and effective is appropriate policy. 
Employees need to understand and acknowledge that they have limited expectation of 
privacy within the workplace (Farley, 2003).
If you do suspect an individual o f intellectual asset theft, there are some steps you 
can take according to Dr. J. Stanton (2003), Professor o f Criminal Justice at Syracuse
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University, to satisfy your suspicion assuming you already have the right policies and 
procedures in place. Electronic data stored even temporarily leave a fingerprint, and 
most systems make record of how they were accessed. In such situations, it is not 
uncommon to covertly investigate the suspect for signs of aberrant behavior. A covert, 
forensic evaluation o f an unsuspecting subject’s computer, for example, can reveal 
information that was accessed, e-mail and other documents providing evidence of plans, 
etc., and Internet histories. Reviews o f access logs and audit trails can reveal evidence o f 
information downloads from the IT system. Reviews o f physical access logs, CCTV 
records etc., can reveal odd hours or visits to physical locations within a facility that are 
suspicious. The key is to gather this information in a covert fashion, as an organization’s 
credibility is at stake when and if accusations o f such behavior are made.
In the world o f intellectual asset security, there is no “magic bullet.” No one, 
simple, elegant solution exists, because o f the fact that access must be granted to insiders 
such as employees in order to do their job. Keeping your assets secure is dependent on 
effective monitoring and detection programs that allow you to act quickly when loss is 
suspected and provide solid evidence for prosecution when it does occur (Stanton, 2003).
Behavior and Attitudes
The effectiveness o f information-security technologies depends upon the behavior 
o f the individuals involved in its use (Stanton, 2003). Appropriate and constructive 
behavior by users and system administrators can enhance the effectiveness of 
information-security technologies while inappropriate and/or destructive behaviors can 
inhibit their effectiveness (Shaw, Post, & Rudy, 2002). Human behavior is notoriously 
complex and multi-faceted, and this complexity defies the expectations for predictability
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and control that technology experts sometimes assume for the artifacts with which they 
work. Guides to behavior (e.g., organizational security policies) and incentives that 
reward or punish behavior (e.g., bonuses) can influence security-related behavior, 
sometimes in counterintuitive ways.
Perfect security is impossible, but companies should aim to provide a level of 
security appropriate to their business and operational needs. Security practices must 
include employee understanding and participation in order to be successful. Ernst and 
Young, along with Information Week Magazine, conducted a landmark study on 
information security that involved 4,226 participants from various-sized organizations in 
30 countries. The survey drew responses from information systems chiefs, information 
security officers, and other high-level technology managers worldwide. The 
methodology used in determining those who received surveys was randomly chosen 
based on subscribers of Information Week Magazine. The survey included an 
international component, a total o f  3,599 IT managers working in 24 countries, including 
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands (Ernst and Young, 1997).
Among the survey’s main findings: security breaches are on the rise; intranets 
bring vulnerability; viruses are still a threat; and industrial espionage is real. Security 
breaches have made IT security professionals wary. More than 75% of the 627 IT 
managers and professionals surveyed believe authorized users and employees pose a 
threat to the security of their systems. The Ernst and Young survey further states that 
nearly 70% of the respondents see computer terrorism as a threat. Another 42% also see 
a security threat from competitors. Even service providers, consultants, and auditors are 
suspects, according to 61% o f the respondents. Fifty-two percent o f the respondents said
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their companies had implemented a security product or tool in the past year as a security 
measure. Although more than half said they had implemented security polices, 27% cited 
employee awareness as the biggest barrier to addressing security concerns (Sibley, 1998).
Corporations have long identified information security as a major concern.
Nearly three-quarters o f the respondents said that information and data security were 
important to their organization’s senior managers. But, this growing concern has not also 
translated into action. Companies have been reluctant to spend money on security 
because it is so difficult to prove that security serves the bottom. For all too many 
companies security has been viewed as overhead (Davis, 1997).
How do you make employees become more aware o f security? It begins with 
training. According to McShane (2002), “It is important to note that training sessions 
that make a difference in employees’ attitudes towards safety and security does not just 
happen; they must be developed, nurtured and synchronized with the other demands on 
employees’ time and attention” (McShane, 2002 p .121). Training is hard work. 
Developing effective curricula requires solid direction on the part o f the security director. 
Training cannot occur in a vacuum and its effectiveness is dependent on the events that 
occur before, during, and after the actual training, and is influenced greatly by individual 
characteristics and factors related to the work environment (McShane, 2002).
According to Pescatore (2002), people are often the weakest links in security 
initiatives. To solve this “people problem,” companies can sufficiently improve 
employee attitudes toward security by encouraging them to behave more responsibly. 
Companies can also encourage people to look for ways to “save people from themselves”
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by exploiting technology that reduces the human factor in security. This can be done 
through continued awareness and education.
Employers should watch for a number o f key characteristics that may indicate a 
security risk (Carter, 2002). Security threats may include employees who:
1. Are generally unhappy on the job, or unhappy with the location o f their 
assignment
2. Believe they have been overlooked for promotion, salary increases, or 
commendations and rewards.
3. Feel their contributions to the company are ignored and uncompensated
4. Are facing personal financial difficulties
5. Have personal problems.
Carter further states that there are a number o f measures that employers can take 
toward encouraging positive behavior and attitudes o f their employees with regard to 
security practices.
1. Training: employee training should include information about security threats 
and procedures.
2. Accountability: ensuring that employees follow procedures, perform 
efficiently, and adhere to organizational values will help maintain personnel integrity.
3. Positive work environment: by increasing one’s employees’ sense of worth 
within the organization one can increase their sense o f obligation and loyalty.
4. Positive rewards: to balance the threat o f discipline, positive contributions to 
the organization must be reinforced and rewarded.
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5. Reinforcement o f ethics and values: companies must strengthen their 
employees’ sense o f moral obligation through a statement o f organizational values, 
reinforcement o f ethical standards, and high standards o f professionalism (Carter, 2002).
In addition to these safeguards, according Carter, corporations should consider the 
following precautions:
1. De-stigmatizing compromising situations (for example, homosexuality)
2. Accountability and access controls for temporary professional workers
3. Classification systems and model criminal and civil liability legislation for 
non-defense related intellectual property
4. Limits on outside employee consulting
5. Controlling and supervising the access o f temporary personnel to sensitive 
information (Carter, 2002).
Contract Employees in Workforce
With all the workplace issues that companies have to juggle, the hiring and
management o f contract workers might be low on the list. Why worry about temps, who
are here today, gone tomorrow, and are as expendable as paper clips? They’re hardly as
important as the hiring, training, and compensation o f regular employees (Lachnit, 2002).
That is one school o f thought. But some companies realize that temps are not quite so
trivial. In their view, it is critical to have a clear concept o f how temps are hired,
managed, and released. A company that uses contract workers but does not track them
could find itself on shaky legal and security ground. Consider the following:
Microsoft Corporation agreed to a $97 million settlement in 2000 to end a long 
court battle with its “permatemps,” contract workers who were hired for years at a 
time by the software company, allegedly in an attempt to avoid paying them for 
health benefits, pensions, and employee stock-purchase plans.
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The records o f another company based in Edina, Minnesota, showed that 1,200 
security badges had been issued to IT contractors, but the company had only 400 
temps in its workforce. That meant that 800 active security badges were in the 
hands o f people who could “come in and do what they wanted,” although they no 
longer worked at the site. (Lachnit, 2002 p.43).
In the bigger picture, according to Norris (2000), contract employees, in contrast 
to the direct-hire employees, do not have loyalty to their employers. Consider that the 
average 32-year-old has worked for nine different companies, and 17 million Americans 
voluntarily quit their jobs to find better ones in 1999, according to a career survey by the 
Economist. Just 5 years ago, that number was 6 million. In such an environment, 
companies are realizing it is more effective to hire workers a la carte, matching the right 
talent to the right task, right now (Norris, 2000).
It is estimated that the number o f contract workers is as high as one-fifth o f all 
employed workers in the United States according to a 1999 study by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. It is clear that contract workers are here to stay (Norris, 2000). There are steps 
that companies can take to assure that they are getting quality contract help. A Human 
Resource Department should be in the business o f managing contract workers, if  those 
workers make up a regular part o f  an organization’s staffing. Closely scrutinizing 
staffing companies and understanding their policies for recruiting such as assuring that 
criminal and education background checks are done before a potential contract worker is 
sent to a company for a job interview will help to ensure that quality workers are found 
(Lachnit, 2002). The utilizing o f contract employees should be on limited assignment 
and their access to confidential information should be avoided. Companies, on the other 
hand, can reward loyal contract employees by offering better compensation packages. As 
contract workers become an integral part o f the company, managers may consider
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offering equity for hours worked or projects completed. High-performing contract 
workers may also be rewarded with more vacation time, benefits, and paid-time off to 
ensure that they continue to perform at a high level. This could help in assuring that 
these employees follow security policies (Norris, 2000).
Workplace Violence
The combination o f increasing layoffs and the specter o f the threat o f terrorism 
after September 11, 2001, when coupled with the ongoing economic doldrums may very 
well add to the stress that workers are feeling (White, 2003). Corporate managers must 
address this important issue. Serious consequences occur when managers fail to address 
potential workplace violence. According to the U.S. Bureau o f Labor Statistics (1999), 
fatal assaults are the second-largest cause of all on-the-job deaths, and the leading cause 
of on-the-job death among women. The Bureau o f the Labor Statistics (BLS) reported 
the following cases in its November 1999 report:
1. In July, a frustrated day-trader killed nine and wounded 13 at two brokerage 
houses in Atlanta, Georgia.
2. In August, in a suburb o f Birmingham, Alabama, a man shot two former co­
workers as well as a third man to death at the company where he used to work (BLS, 
1999).
According to the latest BLS report (2001), 11% o f the 5,915 on-the-job deaths in 
2000 were homicides. Women were three times more likely than men to be murdered on 
the job. As the toll mounts, fear grows and productivity suffers. Under the Occupational 
Safety Act (OSHA), employers have a general duty to provide employees with work, and 
a workplace free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or
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serious physical harm. Workplace violence prevention has generally been accepted as 
falling under the auspices of this general duty clause when there are hazards that include 
the following conditions:
1. Create a significant risk to employees in other than a freakish or utterly 
implausible concurrence of circumstances
2. Are known to the employer and are considered hazards in the employer’s 
business or industry
3. Are ones which the employer can reasonably be expected to prevent (Nixon,
2002).
Companies can no longer afford to ignore the problem. Thinking characterized 
by the statement “It can’t happen here” is denial. And denial is not a strategy. 
Corporations must understand that training enhances security. Managers must be taught 
to spot and defuse problems before they explode. A knowledgeable manager is an 
essential part o f a company’s security plan (Lipman, 2000).
Productivity often declines after an incident o f workplace violence. Injured 
workers no longer perform assigned tasks. Investigators interrupt attempts to resume 
work. Damages must be repaired. Survivors talk about the assailant’s behavior and 
speculate about reasons. Counseling sessions are scheduled. Increased stress reduces 
efficiency (Lipman, 2000).
A serious incident may also undermine morale and encourage turnover. While 
most individuals accept responsibility for their safety at home, many employees hold the 
employer responsible for providing a safe work environment (Lipman, 2000).
Employees who perceive the workplace as unsafe are likely to leave. A high turnover
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rate results in higher hiring and training expenses. In addition, experienced staff 
members disappear. The impact o f turnover and the loss o f knowledgeable employees 
may be felt by those outside the workplace as well. Media accounts o f the violent 
behavior and the related rumors can influence a customer’s buying decisions, especially 
when service or repairs occur on site.
Multiple lawsuits are not an uncommon result o f workplace violence. Benefits 
provided to an employee’s family by Worker’s Compensation are usually a family’s only 
remedy from the employer for any accidental work-related death or injury (Torkildson, 
1999). “Supervisors may be sued for willfully and wantonly allowing the employee to 
work in an unsafe environment, even if  the employer can rely on W orker’s Compensation 
benefits as the exclusive remedy” (Torkildson, 1999, p .l). The state director o f labor can 
also cite an employer for not providing a workplace free from recognized hazards likely 
to cause death or serious injury.
Torkildson (1999) goes on to say, “An employer can take at least six steps to 
protect against these disastrous consequences”(p.14):
1. Distribute a written “zero-tolerance” policy. Warn employees that any threats 
o f violence or acts o f violence will result in disciplinary action, including possible 
discharge. Encourage employees to report possible violations. Assure them that there 
will be a prompt investigation, appropriate protection, and no retaliation for reporting 
about management, co-workers, or others.
2. Train all employees to recognize the possibility o f violence, to handle 
threatening situations, to take security measures, and to evacuate the premises. Safety 
consultants and law enforcement officials can provide guidance on the characteristics of
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those most likely to commit an act o f workplace violence. It is important to remember 
that one who commits violence at work may not fit the common profile. Some 
psychiatrists describe the potential perpetrator as someone who is a loner, paranoid, 
depressed, undergoing stress, and/or who is fascinated with weaponry.
3. Analyze the workplace and eliminate potential hazards. Consider engineering 
and administrative controls that reduce risk. Many corporations have receptionists, 
security guards, or barriers to control access. Some facilities use metal detectors. Assess 
how specific any reported threat is, whether the person making the threat can carry it out, 
and what precautions are needed to protect employees, customers, and others. Discharge 
the worker if  there is no other way to ensure safety. Offer the worker an off-site 
assistance program. Obtain a District Court injunction to keep the employee away from 
the work facility, supervisors, and others threatened by his or her behavior.
4. Require written employment applications and evaluate them carefully.
Identify discrepancies, unanswered questions, short periods o f employment, suspicious 
reasons for leaving, and gaps in work history. Conduct personal interviews before hiring 
anyone. Ask the applicant about suspicious answers: whether he or she can handle the 
stress o f the position, how he or she reacts when dealt with unfairly, and whether or not 
there is anything that would prevent him or her from performing essential job functions.
5. Investigate any criminal convictions within the last 10 years, but only after 
making a conditional offer o f employment. If  a conviction bears a rational relationship to 
the duties o f the position, withdraw the offer.
6. Plan who will be responsible for the immediate care o f any victims and their 
families. This would include crisis intervention counseling for the employees, family
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members, and any coworkers involved in the incident. It should also be decided in 
advance who will debrief witnesses and who will communicate with law enforcement 
officials, government agencies, insurers, media, and the public. Someone must also have 
the responsibility o f determining when it is appropriate to resume normal operations 
(Torkildson, 1999).
Internal workplace violence was a fact o f life long before September 11, 2001.
To combat this problem, policy makers must give attention to this issue. They need to 
broaden their focus so as to encompass the entire work environment, not just the 
perpetrator who is only a single part o f the problem. While the killer is ultimately to 
blame for his act, employers must ask themselves whether or not they have contributed to 
the outcome in any way.
“Workplace violence has continued at its usual pace because some employers 
have simply failed to adequately address the problem. This has not been done purposely, 
but due rather to a lack o f awareness o f the problem” (Chavez, 2002, p.2).
The first place to begin in the process o f eliminating workplace violence is with 
the first-line supervisors. They are the eyes and ears o f most organizations. Through 
their span o f control, they see every single person in the organization every day. For that 
reason, they are in the best position to spot problems at the earliest stages. Once trained, 
they are able to take action to deal appropriately with the situation. Training for first-line 
supervisors is inadequate in most organizations. At a minimum, organizations should 
provide training and establish a competency model on violence prevention for first-line 
supervisors (Chavez, 2002).
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In the final analysis, organizations are graded on their violence-prevention efforts. 
Unfortunately, this usually takes the form of a lawsuit for wrongful death or negligence 
brought against the organization by the grieving family o f an employee who was killed in 
a violent incident. The grading is extremely harsh and carries with it even harsher 
monetary penalties. “Hundreds o f thousands o f dollars are spent just settling lawsuits and 
millions are paid out when there is a finding of negligence against the employer”
(Chavez, 2002, p.3). Organizations which have been diligent in their training are able to 
mitigate some of the damages by demonstrating to the court that they acted with due 
diligence and in good faith by providing employees with the awareness necessary to 
recognize and deal with the threat against them. Violence prevention through education 
is a sound practice because it seeks to protect people. Secondary to that should be the 
concern for reducing civil liability. If  an employer is ever concerned that violence- 
prevention training is an unnecessary expense, just consider the cost o f not having it at all 
(Chavez, 2002).
Information Security Within XYZ Engineering Center
XYZ Engineering Center has a policy in place that addresses the area of 
information security. The XYZ Corporate Information Security Policy was developed to 
ensure the protection o f all XYZ’s informational assets such as plants, machinery, 
equipment, capital, and human resources.
Protection o f XYZ information is critical to XYZ Engineering Center’s continued 
success in all areas o f its business. In a letter to all general managers, group executives, 
staff executives, and heads o f staff sections, Chief Executive Officer and President John
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
47
Doe states that “information is the life blood o f my organization, second only to its 
employees in importance” (Doe, 1993, p .l).
Doe (1993) goes on to say that as competitive pressure continues to increase in 
the global industry, the importance o f protecting XYZ’s sensitive information becomes 
even more paramount. Furthermore, Doe states that its competitive position in the global 
marketplace depends on how each and every member o f the XYZ team manages and 
protects the company’s information resources. The company’s policy covering 
information security (Corporate Information Security Policy Manual, 2001) contains the 
following five key elements.
1. Information is an asset to the corporation. It is created, transmitted, and 
received throughout each business day. In order for this information to be adequately 
protected and accessible, it must be recorded in various forms, stored in an appropriate 
system, retrieved efficiently, and disposed o f properly.
2. Information owner is usually the senior-level manager who has been formally 
assigned to exercise XYZ’s proprietary rights and fiduciary responsibilities for 
information. Information of a confidential nature should not be stored on a computer’s 
hard-drive. This type o f information should be saved on disks that can be kept with an 
individual. If the computer has a security device, the computer terminal should be locked 
and the key taken when an individual leaves. The senior-level manager to other XYZ 
employees may delegate this responsibility.
3. Security procedures are to ensure the protection o f information and data so 
that it is not disclosed to an individual who is not authorized to access it. Confidentiality
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includes protection of the actual information, as well as physical protection (hardware, 
software, and communications) o f the information access points.
4. The integrity o f security procedures ensures that information and systems are 
free from inaccuracies, and can be accomplished by continuous audits to ensure quality. 
The information is the same as the source documents and has not been exposed to 
accidental or international modifications, disclosures, or destruction. It is correct or 
accurate to the degree anticipated by those who use it.
5. Security procedures are to ensure that information is available when and 
where needed. This includes activities such as disaster recovery planning and record 
retention requirements.
ABC Corporation is a manufacturing division o f XYZ Engineering Center, and 
has taken the lead in the information security area. ABC is a strong advocate o f job 
candidate screening, perimeter security, computer information security, security 
awareness programs, and customer and supplier relations (Leggat, 1999). According to 
R. Leggat, Director o f Security at ABC, in a security information report to employees, 
stated the following information: Confidential prints are to be locked up, and should be 
checked for any possible reclassification. When appropriate, confidential and secure 
information should be reclassified. All parts and test equipment that are kept out in the 
open (on desktops, counters, file cabinets, or in vehicles, etc.) should be accounted for 
and properly controlled to prevent loss (Leggat, 1999).
Leggat further states that computer discs containing classified information should 
be locked in desks or drawers when an individual employee is away from his or her 
office. This includes securing lockable disc storage cases, which are portable and easily
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carried away. Individual departments should include computer disc security in any 
information security-risk analysis.
Unless otherwise directed, computers should not be left on overnight. All 
computers must be password-protected. Laptop computers should be secured and locked 
up when not in use. While in use, it is important for laptop users to cable his or her 
computer while working at his or her station. Finally, employees should ensure that, 
under no circumstances, are passwords left out on desks, in close proximity to his or her 
dedicated computer station, or to one that is shared with others.
According to Leggat (1999) each employee should be required, by departmental 
policy, to keep a current backup copy o f his or her hard-drive. If  it is not the 
responsibility o f the company’s technology support department, the employee should 
ensure that the back-up copy is stored in a secure location.
Classified information should not be on any shared or common LAN network 
systems, unless previous access restrictions are in place. Managers and supervisors 
should instruct all employees to make a practice o f periodically reviewing all the data 
stored on the LAN systems within their realm of responsibility and to purge all 
unnecessary and sensitive data immediately.
Leggat (1999) further states that preventive measures must be in place and 
working to deter the unauthorized removal o f confidential mail during non-business 
hours. At a minimum, this means a controlled mailroom that can be locked each night. It 
may mean that each department must review its mail for sensitive information and secure 
itself at the end o f each business day. Additional controls must be in place for incoming 
mail that is clearly marked “confidential.” This correspondence should be hand-delivered
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to the respective department instead o f being placed in an open mail slot. Ongoing 
testing will determine what other steps are needed to meet procedural compliance.
Leggat goes on to state that locked containers with a chute at the top to prevent 
the removal o f information should be used to dispose o f all documents of a confidential 
nature. Confidential bins should be emptied on a regular basis to prevent overfilling and 
document removal. Custodial services should be contacted immediately if  a problem 
occurs with any confidential bins.
Place signs on or by all fax machines informing employees to either be at the 
machine during an incoming classified fax or have the fax sent to a secured location. Fax 
machines should be lockable, in a secured area, or programmable for limited hours o f 
operation where practical.
Departmental audits should be performed to ensure extra or unneeded classified 
material from copier machines is discarded in confidential bins.
Periodic departmental checks o f conference/war rooms/halls should be performed 
to confirm that sensitive information is not displayed on the walls (or restrict conference 
room usage to authorized personnel).
Any classified information left in conference rooms should be properly discarded 
after a meeting (erase boards, discard sheets from flip charts, etc.). A sweep of 
conference rooms for classified information before meetings start is recommended.
Finally Leggat states that hallways where visitors or unauthorized personnel travel 
should be cleared o f all classified information (Leggat, 1999).
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XYZ Policy on Workplace Violence
The XYZ Engineering Center has a policy on workplace violence that is defined 
as the following, “any act occurring in the workplace, which results in threatened or 
actual harm to persons or property.” In addition to this, the policy states further examples 
o f what is considered threats: “threats, physical assaults or stalking o f another person 
causing fear, worry, intimidation or injury.” Finally the policy states that XYZ will not 
“tolerate any threat -  direct or implied physical conduct by any person which results in 
harm to people or property, harasses another, or disrupts or interferes with another’s work 
performance, thereby creating an intimidating, offensive or hostile environment” (XYZ 
Policy, 2001).
As part o f XYZ’s commitment to the prevention of workplace violence, the 
company has taken further steps by offering a class entitled “Violence Workplace 
Overview.” The course is designed to increase the supervisor’s awareness to workplace 
violence. Methods to assist the supervisor in identifying and preventing incidents are 
presented through the viewing o f various types o f situations and discussions o f methods 
o f responding and getting appropriate assistance. The course also creates a forum to 
educate supervisors on workplace violence polices. XYZ is committed to providing a 
safe work environment for all employees and will continually monitor and adjust its 
policy as needed.
Summary
The literature review examined the history o f security, which dates back to 
ancient Roman times. In America, private security was dominant in the 19th century due
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to the slow development o f law enforcement. This led up to a private security force of 
200,000 by the end of World War II.
Security measures in today’s industry have become more technologically 
advanced. With a growing dependence on computers, the theft o f corporate secrets is 
stronger and confidential material more likely at risk than it has ever been. In today’s 
global economy, the theft o f industrial secrets and information has rivaled competition 
for military secrets, which characterized the Cold War.
Violence in the workplace is also becoming more prevalent today. Fatal assaults 
are the second largest cause o f on-the-job deaths in this country. Companies must 
increase training to handle potential violent situations.
The unprecedented events o f September 11, 2001, underscore the need to 
integrate security management throughout business operations. Responsibility for 
security can no longer be delegated to a discrete functional unit that is called upon to deal 
with temporary emergencies, and otherwise left alone. In the present environment and 
for the foreseeable future, security must be regarded as integral to the management 
process and to the continued viability o f corporate operations (Cavanagh, 2002).
The process o f developing an effective information security policy should also be 
a top priority in an organization. The policy should define the objectives o f the 
organization and outline a strategy to obtain the stated objectives. A security team needs 
to inform and educate the employees o f that organization about its security policies and 
procedures. Employees must realize that they are an integral part o f information security 
process. This process is not easily executed and organizations must constantly strive to
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improve the process and provide the best defense against threats to the organization (Lee, 
2001).
XYZ Engineering has recognized that effective information security is vital to the 
company’s continued ability to be a profitable force in today’s marketplace. The 
corporation has outlined procedures that employees are expected to follow, which assures 
the utmost security o f all the company’s assets and, more importantly, the safety o f its 
most important asset, its people. With regard to safety, the XYZ Engineering security 
organization has a major responsibility in this regard. Ultimately, the security of XYZ 
Engineering depends on the vigilance and individual efforts o f all employees. Ronald 
Kettler (2003), executive director o f security, offers suggestions employees can take to 
help ensure the security o f XYZ Engineering people and its facilities. Employees should 
be observant and report the following conditions to security personnel or their 
supervisors:
1. Suspicious packages, boxes, etc.
2. Suspicious vehicles near the building
3. Suspicious individuals, such as those taking photographs or videos o f the
facility, asking questions about deliveries o f flammable liquids, or unescorted visitors in
restricted areas (Kettler, 2003).
Judith Barclay, XYZ Vice-President o f Global Human Resource, states that 
creating and keeping a secure workplace is possible only through the efforts of all 
employees. As XYZ Engineering Center moves forward, employees must operate 
differently than in years past. Times are changing and the XYZ Engineering Center must 
stay current in order to remain competitive (Barclay, 2003).
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In an effort to obtain benchmark information from other companies the researcher 
experienced difficulty in researching. With technology rapidly advancing, this research 
is groundbreaking. There have been very few studies done in the area o f information 
security and how it relates to employees. Also, the researcher discovered that due to the 
highly sensitive nature o f this topic, many companies displayed reluctance in sharing any 
security-related information. The references obtain for this study include staff writers for 
security journals, practitioners in the information security field, and senior executives 
responsible for corporate security. The staff writers include M. Arbetter, writer for the 
Security Management Magazine, J. Betts, writer for Computer World Magazine, B. 
Harley, staff writer for Business Security Magazine, and W. McShane, writer for, 
BottomLine Magazine. The credentials o f some executive include R. Littlejohn, Director 
o f Corporate Security for Avon Products, M. Koshel, Vice-President o f Corporate 
Security Citibank, and M. Goodboe, Director o f Security Wakenhut Security Training 
Institute.
Chapter 2 provided a broad overview o f information security in a business setting, 
as well as the steps employees and employers should follow. The following chapters will 
focus specifically on XYZ Engineering Center’s employees and their attitudes toward 
understanding, value, and practice o f information security at XYZ Engineering Center.
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METHODOLOGY
This study was designed to answer the following questions regarding corporate 
guidelines related to information and product security, as well as employees’ perception 
of personal safety at work:
Question 1: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center understand the 
information secunty guidelines as set forth by the corporation?
Question 2: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center value information 
security?
Question 3: Do employees at the XYZ Engineering Center practice corporate 
guidelines related to information security?
Question 4: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center feel safe from any physical 
harm while at work?
Research Design
In an effort to answer the above research questions, a survey of contract and 
salaried employees of XYZ Engineering was conducted. This survey utilized a 
questionnaire, which was developed based on the Likert Scale design. The use of the 
Likert Scale allows the researcher to obtain more quantitative information about the 
survey subject (Alinea Group, 2003). The Likert Scale is popular among business
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researchers for measuring attitude, and the method is simple to administer (Zikmund, 
1991). The research questions were not of an exploratory nature, which would be 
appropriate in a qualitative study, but rather designed to measure attitudes that could be 
quantified in the use of rejecting or retaining hypotheses. For these reasons the Likert 
Scale survey was chosen over an open-ended survey.
Responses were gathered in a standardized way, so questionnaires are more 
objective—certainly more so than interviews (Milne, 1999). According to J.S. Roberts, 
“When the quantitative component to research is applied, the Likert Scale is commonly 
used, since it has the form with which everyone is familiar” (Roberts, 1999 p.123). 
Roberts goes on to say that there is some slight degraded validity of the Likert Scale at 
attitude extremes, i.e., (1) or (5) but points out that it has nothing to do with frequency 
responses. Roberts (1999) further concluded that unless identification of extremes is 
important to the study, the Likert Scale would provide results within an acceptably valid 
range. The words on the Likert Scale can be converted in a meaningful way to an 
interval scale (1 through 5), which gives the researcher the ability to use totals or to 
calculate numerical averages, which can then be used to respond to the research 
hypotheses (McCall, 2001).
Instrument
A self-reporting questionnaire, utilizing a 5 point Likert scale, was developed 
(Appendix A). The questions were developed based on information obtained from 
employee guidelines taken from the XYZ Corporate Information Security Manual. The 
Security Manual is common throughout the entire corporation, which includes XYZ 
Engineering, the engineering division of XYZ Corporation. This manual provides its
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employees with the necessary procedure to exercise the security policies. Questions were 
designed by the researcher and then randomly placed within the survey. Respondents 
were asked to respond to each of the 19 questions using the following rank order:
Strongly Disagree -  1; Disagree -  2; Neutral -  3; Agree -  4; and Strongly Agree -  5. In 
order to increase the survey’s readability and clarity, the questionnaire was field-tested on 
five XYZ employees. These five employees met the population selection criteria, but 
were excluded from participating in the research study. The survey was pre-tested on 
five people for clarity, with the following results. The design of the survey was revised 
from a previous design with the Likert Scale starting with Strongly Disagree (1) to 
Strongly Agree (5). In addition, the initials (SD), (D), (N), (A), and (SA) were replaced 
with the numbers 1 through 5. The five employees who evaluated the survey consisted of 
the following: one non-technical contract employee; one contract technical employee; 
one XYZ salaried manager; one XYZ salaried technical employee; and one non-technical 
XYZ salaried employee.
Some additional changes were made on the original questionnaire. Question 4, 
originally stated, “I feel that a strong product security program is important to the 
survival of XYZ,” conflicted with question 14 which originally stated, “I feel the 
department that I am currently working in has adequate information security practices.” 
The confusion was in trying to differentiate between the word information and product. 
The word product led respondents to think of the actual product (i.e., the automobile), 
whereas the word information related to actual confidential information, which is the 
focus of this study. Based on this response, the word product in question 4 was changed 
to information. In addition, the title “Information and Product Security Survey” had the
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word product removed. Questions 7 and 15 on the original questionnaire were also 
revised to remove the word product.
A respondent raised a question regarding demographic questions 20, 21, and 22 
on the original questionnaire, as to the relevance to this survey. I explained to the 
respondent that there could be a correlation between the demographic responses and the 
level of security awareness. I decided to retain all demographic questions. In addition, 
Dr. James Liddy, an adjunct instructor of statistics and research methods at Spring Arbor 
University, evaluated the questionnaire. Dr. Liddy recommended the addition of question 
23, which provides further demographic information about a respondent’s status as a 
technical, non-technical, or management employee. The final version of the 
questionnaire can be found in Appendix A.
Population and Sample 
Five hundred employees work at XYZ Engineering Center. However, 100 hourly 
employees were excluded from the study due to their limited and restricted access to 
confidential information. Technical and non-technical salaried and long-term contracted 
employees comprised the remaining 400 members of the XYZ Engineering Center’s 
work-force. These 400 individuals served as the population for this study.
Variables and M easures 
The researcher developed a self-reporting questionnaire, utilizing a 5 point Likert 
scale. Respondents were asked to respond to each of the 19 questions using the following 
rank order: Strongly Disagree -  1; Disagree -  2; Neutral -  3; Agree -  4; and Strongly 
Agree -  5, along with four demographic questions. Returned surveys which were not
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100 % completed were discarded. Only the surveys that were returned by the study’s 
designated deadline and were 100% completed were included in the statistical analysis.
The survey statements addressed categories of information regarding the study 
participants’ self-reported perceptions about understanding and practicing information 
security at XYZ. Questions 1 through 19 are designed to measure the opinions of the 
respondents on several key issues with regard to risk management and work-place safety. 
Questions 20 through 23 provide for the necessary demographic information that is 
needed to interpret the study’s findings. The demographic questions asked the 
respondent to indicate his or her length of service and time in his or her current position. 
Additional demographic questions determine whether the participant was an XYZ 
salaried or contract employee and his or her job type (i.e., management, technical, or non­
technical).
Questions 5, 7, 9, 15, and 19 measure the perceived beliefs of the respondents in 
regard to understanding information security. Employees were asked to report their 
perceptions with regard to the following:
1. His or her understanding of the importance of information security 
(question 5)
2. His or her understanding of XYZ’s policy on information security, and if he or 
she would be interested in learning more about information security (questions 9 and 15)
3. His or her knowledge of who to contact when a security breech occurs 
(question 19)
Questions 4, 13, and 14 measured the value that employees place on information 
security:
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1. His or her belief about .information security’s importance to XYZ’s success 
(question 4)
2. His or her belief about the level of access that contract employees should have 
to classified information (question 13)
3. His or her belief about the adequacy of security (14).
Questions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12 measured the degree to which employees 
practice information security with regard to the following:
1. His or her practice of securing sensitive data and valuables (questions 1, 8,
and 12)
2. His or her practices of displaying ED badges (question 2)
3. His or her practice of shredding documents (question 11)
4. His or her practices of keeping passwords secure (question 10)
5. His or her practice of challenging unknown persons (question 3)
6. His or her observation of security officers performing inspections of lunch 
box, briefcase (question 6).
Questions 16. 17, 18 measured the perceived beliefs of employees concerning 
workplace safety:
1. His or her perception of physical safety while at work (question 16)
2. His or her knowledge of security breeches while in work area and outside of 
immediate work area (questions 17, 18).
Procedures
Written permission to distribute a survey to employees was obtained from the 
XYZ Engineering Center’s Human Resource Department and submitted to Andrews
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University Institutional Review Board for its approval. The self-reporting questionnaire 
was distributed to 395 of the 400 employees listed in the XYZ directory. The five 
individuals selected to pre-test the survey were excluded from participating in the final 
research. The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was distributed via inter-office mail. A 
letter (Appendix B), stating the purpose of the study, was included with each 
questionnaire. The letter requested that each respondent completely fill out the survey 
and return it, anonymously, to the researcher. The letter also communicated that 
participation was voluntary and not required. The letter indicated that the completed 
surveys were to be returned to the researcher, via inter-office mail, by September 23, 
2002. Any survey returned that was not completely filled out was discarded.
On October 7, 2002, a second letter was sent to managers asking that they remind 
employees to return surveys, if they had not done so, no later than October 21, 2002. 
Immediately following the October deadline, the researcher counted the returned, 
completed surveys. These two notices resulted in 189 completed questionnaires for use 
in this study.
Data Analysis Methods
Each question was analyzed separately for means, medians, and standard 
deviations. The differences between the mean of each question and neutral (3.0) were 
tested using two tests, the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and r-test. From this 
descriptive, statistics were analyzed and tables were created to reflect the results of the 
data collected. Hypotheses 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13, and 14 used ANOVA due to the number 
of variables being analyzed. Hypotheses 3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 were tested using a 
two sample r-test analysis method. Significant differences are said to exist if the
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calculated alpha value was greater than >.05. If the sample mean was beyond the critical 
value, the mean was considered to be in the region of rejection. Thus, the null hypothesis 
was rejected if the means are significantly different at the .05 alpha level. If the sample 
mean is between the critical values, the mean is considered contained in the acceptable 
region and the null hypothesis could not be rejected. The results of the hypothesis test 
were used to answer the following research questions and to make recommendations 
based on the results.
Question 1: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center understand the 
information security guidelines as set forth by the corporation?
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
security guidelines based on length of service.
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
security guidelines based on time in current position.
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
security guidelines based on salary employee or contract employee status.
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
security guidelines based on technical employee or non-technical employee status.
Question 2: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center value information 
security?
Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in employee views on the value 
of information security based on length of service.
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in employee views on the value 
of information security based on time in current position.
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Hypothesis 7: There is no significant difference in employee views on the value 
of information security based on salary employee or contract employee status.
Hypothesis 8: There is no significant difference in employee views on the value 
of information security based on technical employee or non-technical employee status.
Question 3: Do the employees at the XYZ Engineering Center practice corporate 
guidelines related to information security?
Hypothesis 9: There is no significant difference in employee practice of security 
guidelines based on length of service.
Hypothesis 10: There is no significant difference in employee practice of security 
guidelines based on time in current position.
Hypothesis 11: There is no significant difference in employee practice of security 
guidelines based on salary employee or contract employee status.
Hypothesis 12: There is no significant difference in employee practice of security 
guidelines based on technical employee or non-technical employee status.
Question 4: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center feel safe from any 
physical harm while at work?
Hypothesis 13: There is no significant difference in employee perception of safety 
based on length of service.
Hypothesis 14: There is no significant difference in employee perception of safety 
based on time in current position.
Hypothesis 15: There is no significant difference in employee perception of safety 
based on salary employee or contract employee status.
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Hypothesis 16: There is no significant difference in employee perception of safety 
based on technical employee or non-technical employee status.
The results of the data analysis were used to determine if there is a difference in 
employee views based on the demographics of length of service, time in current position, 
salaried employees or contract employees status, and technical employee or non-technical 
employee.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The purpose of this research was to examine the level at which employees 
understand, value, and practice the corporate guidelines that relate to information 
security at XYZ Engineering Center. This chapter presents the results of the survey 
distributed to the contract and salaried employees of the XYZ Engineering Center. 
The data collected for this study were analyzed using various statistical tests in order 
to determine which of the 16 null hypothesis statements presented in chapter 3 should 
be retained or rejected.
A description of the sample population is provided as well as a thorough 
analysis of the demographic information, which included the following: how long the 
participant has been in his or her current position, his or her length of service, 
whether the respondent was a salaried or contract employee, and whether or not the 
participant’s main job responsibilities would be categorized as managerial, technical, 
or non-technical. (These terms have been clearly defined in chapter 1.) In addition, 
an analysis of the responses to each question is provided, and a detailed summary of 
the findings for each of the 16 null-hypotheses is given.
65
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Description of the Sample
While 500 employees work for the XYZ Engineering Center, only 395 met 
the requirements outlined in the research protocol. Of the 395 surveys distributed,
157 were returned. A second letter was sent to all managers during the month of 
October 2002, requesting that employees be reminded to complete and return the 
surveys - if they had not done so - by October 15, 2002. This resulted in an additional 
36 surveys returned, making a total of 193. Of this number, 4 were not complete and 
were discarded. One hundred and eighty-nine or 47.8% of the surveys distributed met 
all the standards for inclusion and were used in this study. Refer to Appendix A for a 
copy of the questionnaire and Appendix C for the detailed response frequencies and 
descriptive statistics for each question.
The first of four demographic questions asked of the respondents was years of 
service. A description of the respondents’ length of service is found in Table 1.
Table 1
Respondents Length o f Sendee
Length of Service Frequency Percentage
1. 0 -5  Years 84 44.4
2. 6-10 Years 35 18.5
3. 11-15 Years 36 19.0
4. 16-20 Years 19 10.1
5. 21+ Years 15 7.9
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Table 1 provides a breakdown of the respondents based on length of service. 
Employees were grouped in one of five categories under length of service. The 
frequency column represents the number of employees in length of service category, 
along with an accumulated percentage of each the groups. Table 1 shows that group 
one, which represents employees in the 0-5 years of service, had the highest rate of 
responses. When combining the 0-5 year group with group 2, which represents 6-10 
years of service, it shows that 62.9% of the respondents have 10 years or less. In 
relation to this the other three groups, which represents 11-15 years, 16-20, years and 
21+, had a combined rate of response at 37%. These results indicate that the groups 
with less time on the job and perhaps younger-aged employees are more opinionated 
compared to the older employees.
The second demographic question asked for respondents’ time in current 
position. A description of the respondents' time in current position is found in Table
2 .
Table 2
Respondents ’ Time in Current Position
Time current position Frequency Percentage
1. 0-5 Years 111 58.7
2. 6-10 Years 38 20.1
3. 11-15 Years 30 15.9
4. 16-20 Years 8 4.2
5. 21+ Years 2 1.1
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Table 2 represents a breakdown of respondents based on time in current 
position. As with Table 1, employees were grouped in brackets of 5-year increments 
using the same criteria. The results of Table 2 had similar responses as in Table 1. A 
little over 78% had 10 years or less in their current position, whereas the remaining 
there groups representing 11 or more years in their current position had a 21.7% 
response rate. The high rate of responses from the 0-10 year groups could indicate 
that younger employees have a tendency to change positions within the company, 
unlike the older population who have a tendency not to change positions.
The third demographic question asked respondents’ if they are contract or 
salaried employees. A description of the respondents’ status is found in Table 3.
Table 3




Table 3 represents the correlation of salaried and contract employees w'ho 
participated in the survey. The results show that almost half (45.5%) of the 
respondents were contract. This would indicate that although contract employees 
know that they are not considered direct-hire employees of XYZ Engineering, they 
still have opinions and are interested in sharing them.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
69
The fourth demographic question asked respondents if they were 
management, technical, or non-technical employees. A description of the 
respondents’ is found in Table 4.
Table 4
Respondents ’ Type o f Position
Position Frequency Percentage
T echnical 93 49.2
Non-Technical 96 50.8
There were a total of 189 respondents who met the criteria for inclusion. 
Fifteen or 7.9% responded having a management position, 78 or 41.3% are technical, 
while 96 or 50.8% responded as a non-technical. An XYZ Engineering manager’s 
job classification is generally considered technical in nature, therefore for the purpose 
of this study, management and technical responses were combined for the analysis of 
the hypotheses. The results of Table 4 show almost an even split between technical 
and non-technical employees. The results could indicate that employees, regardless 
of education or technical knowledge, have a willingness to share their opinions.
In combining Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, the profile of the average XYZ 
Engineering Center employee is an employee with 10 years or less in length of 
service and time in current position. The average employee is salary and non­
technical.
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Basic Data on the Instrument
In addition to the demographics, the survey questions were divided into four 
groups for the purpose of addressing the research questions. Research question 1 
asked, “Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center understand the information 
security guidelines as set forth by the corporation?” Research question 2 asked, “Do 
employees at XYZ Engineering Center value information security?” Research 
question 3 asked, “Do employees at the XYZ Engineering Center practice corporate 
guidelines related to information security?” Research question 4 asked, “Do 
employees at XYZ Engineering Center feel safe from physical harm while at work?”
Instrument
This section discusses the responses to all four groups. All of the descriptive 
questions 1 through 19 asked the respondents to rate their opinions on a Likert scale 
ranging from strongly disagree (SD), to strongly agree (SA). Numerical values of 1 
for strongly disagree, to 5 strongly agree were assigned for statistical computations. 
The statistics used in the evaluation of each question were the mean, median, standard 
deviation, and minimum to maximum rank value chosen. Tables will be used 
throughout this section to represent the raw data and statistical analysis.
The survey questions 5, 7, 9, 15, and 19 were used to analyze the level of 
understanding that employees’ display toward information security. Table 5 provides 
a breakdown of survey responses to each question ranging from strongly disagree 
(SD) to strongly agree (SA), with N representing neutral. One hundred and eighty- 
nine respondents answered all the questions and the full range of choices from 1 to 5 
was selected for these questions.
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Table 5
Frequency Response o f Survey Population to 
Research Question 1 by Percentage
Survey Question SD D N A SA
(5) Understand policy 1.6 6.3 39.2 45.0 17.9
(7) More information 16.4 29.1 11.6 24.3 18.5
(9) Document classification 1.6 42.3 15.9 27.5 7.4
(15) Training 0.5 42.3 15.9 27.5 13.8
(19) Security breach 2.1 5.8 29.1 58.2 4.8
The first question asked if employees understood XYZ’s policy pertaining to 
information security. The second question asked if respondents would like more 
information from management on information security. The third question asked if 
employees understood XYZ’s policy pertaining to document classification. The 
fourth question asked if employees would be willing to attend a class to be better 
trained in the area of information security. The fifth question asked if employees 
would know whom to contact in the event of a security breach. Table 5 was designed 
to measure the level at which employees understand the information security policy.
It would appear that employees understand the policy given the fact that almost 63% 
agreed on question 5. However, only 34.9% knew the policy relating to document 
classification, while 43.9% did not. The conclusion that could be drawn from these 
results could indicate that employees might think they understand the information 
security policy, but really do not understand the entire policy based on the responses 
to the question of document classification.
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The survey questions analyzed for group two were 4, 13, and 14. These 
questions were used to measure the value employees place on information security. 
Table 6 provides a breakdown of survey responses to each question ranging from 
strongly disagree (SD) to strongly agree (SA), with N representing neutral. One 
hundred and eighty-nine respondents answered all the questions and the full range of 
choices from 1 to 5 was selected for these questions.
Table 6
Frequency Response o f Survey Population to 
Research Question 2 by Percentage
Survey Question SD D N A SA
(4) Security important 1.1 31.2 15.9 24.3 27.5
(13) Contract employees 21.2 35.4 14.3 17.5 11.6
(14) Adequate practice 4.8 37.6 32.8 2° 8 2.1
The first question asked if respondents felt a strong information security 
program was important to the survival of XYZ Engineering. The second question 
asked if less access to classified information should be given to contract employees. 
The third question asked employees if the department that they are currently working 
in has adequate information security practices. Table 6 illustrates results to the issue 
of value placed upon information security. Slightly over half of the employees feel 
that an information security policy is important to the survival of XYZ Engineering 
Center, compared to just over 32% who did not. - The survey question which 
addresses less access to classified information for contract employees had over 56% 
disagree, meaning that contract employees should have more access to the
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information. Contract employees often feel that they are not treated in the same 
manner as salaried employees. This can cause animosity between the two groups as 
witnessed by the researcher. The third question, which addressed adequate practices, 
resulted in a majority 42.4% disagreeing. However, the 32.8% who responded 
neutral could mean those employees either did not understand the question or chose 
not to respond. On the question of employee value of the information security policy, 
the fact that just over half, 51.8%, agreed that information security was important to 
the survival of the company is very alarming.
The survey questions analyzed for group three were 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 
12 these questions were used to measure the degree at which employees practice 
information security. Table 7 provides a breakdown of survey responses to each 
question ranging from strongly disagree (SD) to strongly agree (SA), with N 
representing neutral. One hundred and eighty-nine respondents answered all the 
questions and the full range of choices from 1 to 5 was selected for these questions.
Table 7
Frequency Response o f Survey Population to Research Question 3 by Percentage
Survey Question SD D N A SA
(1) Securing data 4.8 21.2 37.6 28.0 8.5
(2) Display ID 2.6 3.2 9.0 45.0 40.2
(3) Unknown person 25.4 32.3 12.7 23.8 5.8
(6) Check handbags 6.9 10.6 14.8 58.7 9.0
(8) Valuables secured 1.1 - 5.8 28.6 43.4 21.2
(10) Share passwords 2.6 7.4 8.5 53.4 28.0
(11) Shred documents 20.6 35.4 13.8 20.1 10.1
(12) Lock file cabinets 17.5 31.7 5.3 22.2 23.3
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The first question asked if securing sensitive data was a practice done on a 
routine basis. The second question asked if employees displayed company 
identification at all times. The third question asked if employees would approach an 
unknown or unauthorized person if found in employees’ work area. The fourth 
question asked if employees, upon exiting the building, were ever asked to open brief 
cases, lunch boxes, or handbags for inspection by security officers. The fifth question 
asked if employees made sure valuables were secured when away from their desks. 
The sixth question related to the sharing of computer passwords. The seventh 
question asked if employees routinely shred classified documents when no longer 
needed. The eighth question asked if employees locked their desks and file cabinets 
when leaving work for the day.
Questions 2, 6, 8, and 10 had positive responses of at least 60% or higher. 
However, on the issue of challenging an unauthorized or unknown person, 58% 
replied in the negative. Over half of the respondents, 56%, answered they do not 
shred classified documents, with only 30.2% stating that they do shred classified 
documents. Finally nearly half of the respondents, 49.2%, responded in the negative 
with regard to locking their desks, with a 45.5% positive response. While there were 
some encouraging results on some of the questions, there appeared to be a lack of 
practice on others. The fact that 56% of the respondents do not shred classified 
documents is alarming. This corresponds with survey question 9, on research 
question 1, which states that 43.9% of the respondents do not understand the policy 
on document classification. Almost 50% of the respondents indicated they do not 
lock their desk, which is a practice that XYZ Engineering Management strongly
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encourages. The conclusion that could be drawn from these results shows there is 
some lack of practice with room to improve.
The survey questions analyzed for group four were 16, 17 and 18. These 
questions were used to measure the perception of physical safety employees feel 
while at work. Table 8 provides a breakdown of survey responses to each question 
ranging from strongly disagree (SD) to strongly agree (SA), with N representing 
neutral. One hundred and eighty-nine respondents answered all the questions and the 
full range of choices from 1 to 5 was selected for these questions.
Table 8
Frequency Response o f Survey Population to 
Research Question 4 by Percentage
Survey Question SD D N A SA
(16) Safe at work 4.2 10.6 57.7 21.7 5.8
(17) Security breach in area 6.9 24.9 39.2 27.5 1.6
(18) Security breach out of area 7.4 55.6 23.8 11.1 2.1
The first question asked if employees felt safe from physical harm while at 
work. The second question asked if employees were aware of specific instances 
where there was a breach of security in their work area. The third question asked if 
employees were aware of security breaches outside of their work area.
The results of this analysis could indicate that employees have no opinion on 
the issue of safety. Question 16 resulted with over half 57.7% were neutral on the 
subject of safety, whereas only 14.8% felt unsafe and 27.5% felt safe. On question 
17, 39.2% had no opinion on the issue of security breaches in their work area, while
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31.8% were unaware. On question 18, 63% responded that they were not aware of 
any outside security breaches. The fact that such a high percentage of employees had 
no opinion on the issue of safety is puzzling in light of recent terrorist activity. This 
could indicate that employees do not think about safety or do not want to think about 
the possibility of something bad happening at work.
Hypotheses Analysis
Four hypothesis statements were developed for each of the four research 
questions to determine if there were significant differences within the demographic 
groups. The demographic groups consist of a) length of service, b) time in current 
position, c) salary employee or contract employee, and d) technical employee or non­
technical employee.
Each research question and its related four hypothesis statements will be 
discussed in this section. For the first two hypothesis statements for each question, an 
analysis of variance was used (ANOVA) to determine if there were significant 
differences among the groups. The researcher used the Bonferroni Multiple 
Comparison test in conducting the analysis of variance among the five demographic 
groups. Significant differences are said to exist if the calculated F-ratio is greater 
than the tabled F-ratio. The larger the ratio, the greater the variance between groups. 
If the F-value is larger than the table value, it is likely that the results are statistically 
significant (Zikmund, 1991). The second two hypothesis statements related to each 
research question, a two-sample /-test was performed to determine if differences 
existed. If the table /-value was lower than the calculated / value it could be said that 
significant differences exist (Zikmund, 1991).
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Demographic survey question 20 asks respondents’ length of service, and was 
compared against each of the five survey questions that were chosen to answer 
research question 1. Within research question 1, hypotheses 1 and 2 were developed 
to determine if significant differences existed among the demographic groups which 
consisted of the following: length of service and time in current position. In addition 
to this hypothesis 3 and 4 were developed to determine significant differences among 
demographic groups of salary or contract employment status and technical or non­
technical employment status. For hypotheses 3 and 4 and equal variance r-test was 
used to determine significance. Significant differences were said to exist at 95% 
confidence if the table t value was less than the calculated t value.
Table 9
Difference Between Length o f Sen'ice and Understanding o f Information Security’
Calculated Different 
Variable Group .Y SD  F -ra tio  from groups
(5) Understanding 1. 0 -5  Yrs 3.3 3.00 6.52 4
the security 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.1 1.74 3 ,5 .4
policy 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.8 1.71 2
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.9 2.36 2, 1
5. 21+ Yrs 3.8 2.66 2
(7) Would like to 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.0 1.56 36.47 2 ,5 ,4 , 3
learn more on 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 2.43 1,3
information 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.2 2.40 1,2
security 4. 16-20 Yrs 3.8 3.31 1
5.21+  Yrs 3.7 3.72
(9) Understand 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.3 3.70 22.46 2 ,5 ,4 , 3
document 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.8 0.53 1 ,4 ,3
classification 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.7 2.66 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.7 2.65 1,2
5.21+ Yrs 3.3 3.00 1
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Table 9-Continued
(15) Willing to 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.3 1.30 31.18 2, 5 ,4 , 3
attend a class 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.3 2.03 1 ,4 ,3
3. 11-15 Yrs 4.0 2.00 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.0 2.76 1,2
5. 21+ Yrs 3.3 3.10 1
(19) If a security 1. 0 -5  Yrs 3.5 2.52 2.94
breach, know 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 1.73 4
who to call 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.7 1.71
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.8 2.36 2
5. 21+ Yrs 3.6 2.65
The demographic groups that are referenced in Table 9 represent length of 
service. Group one represents employees with 0-5 years of service, group two 
represents employees with 6-10 years of service, group three represents employees 
with 11-15 years of service, group four represents 16-20 years and group five 
represents employees with 21 or more years of service. If significant differences exist 
within the five groups, it is indicated on the table in the column labeled “different 
from groups.” The table compared demographic question 20, length of service to 
survey questions 5. 7, 9, 15, and 19. The calculated F-ratio column represents the 
calculated F-ratio for each question.
The tabled F-ratio of 2.42 is less then the calculated F-ratio on all five 
questions used to test this hypothesis statement. Based on this, it can be concluded 
that the null hypothesis should be rejected. Group one, which represents employees 
with 0-5 years, scored below the mean of 3.0, on three of the five questions indicating 
disagreement from the other groups. Group one-scored over the mean on the question 
of understanding the security policy. However, group one scored below the mean on 
the question relating to document classification, which is a part of the policy. This
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would indicate that perhaps group one does not understand the policy in its entirety. 
See Appendix D for complete Analysis of Variance Report for the survey questions 
used in the analysis of research question 1.
Table 10 illustrates differences within the groups using the same criteria as 
stated above in Table 9. Table 10 shows differences between the groups in the 
analysis of research question 1 “Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center 
understand the information security guidelines set forth by the corporation?” based on 
time in current position.
Table 10
Analysis o f Research o f Question 1 to Hypothesis 2 Time in Current Position
Calculated Different
Variable__________  Group________ X  SD  F -ra tio______ from groups
(5) Understanding 1. 0-5  Yrs 3.4 10.22
the policy 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.3 1.74
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.8 1.96
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.7 3.11
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 7.61
(7) Would like 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.4 1.56 16.64 2. 3, 4
to learn more 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.4 2.67 1
about the 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.1 3.02 1
information 4. 16-20 Yrs 4.2 5.85 1
policy 5. 21+ Yrs 3.5 11.72
(9) Understand 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.6 11.95 12.82 2, 3, 4,
document 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.1 2.03 1
classification 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.7 2.29 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.8 4.45 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 8.90 1
(15) Willing to 1. 0 -5  Yrs 2.6 12.91 14.48 2 ,4 ,3
attend a 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.4 2.19 1
class 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.0 2.47 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.8 4.80 1
5. 21+ Yrs 3.5 9.61
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Table 10-Continued
(19) If a security 1. 0 -5  Yrs 3.5 9.84
breach, know 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.5 1.67
who to call 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.7 1.88
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.6 3.65
5 21+ Yrs 5.0 7.32
Table 10 shows an F-ratio higher than the tabled F-ratio of 2.42 on questions 
7, 9, and 15, which indicates a rejection of the null. The significant differences 
showing in the 0-5 years group, which again scored lower than the mean shifting 
toward, disagree. These results as in Table 9 show that the 0-5 group appears to 
disagree on the subject more so than the rest of the groups. See Appendix D for 
further test results.
Table 11 illustrates the survey questions used to analyze research question 1 
as it relates to hypothesis 3. Demographic question 22, which asks respondents’ 
status of salary or contract, was compared against the questions using an equal 
variance two-sample t test.
Table 11
Analysis o f Research Question 1 to Hypothesis 3
Variable Calculated T- Value Decision @95% P-Value
(5) Aware of policy 0.75 Retain 0.11
(7) More information 17.2 Reject 1.0
(9) Document classification 8.16 Reject 1.0
(15) More training 12.4 Reject 1.0
(19) Breach contact -1.22 Retain 0.22
Note: Population sample salaried n -  103, contract n=86. Tabled r-value 1.98.
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As shown in Table 11, the tabled /-value at 95% confidence is 1.98. Any 
calculated /-values higher than 1.98 resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis. As 
indicated in the table, survey question 5 and survey question 19 resulted in retaining 
the null hypothesis. The remainder of the questions tested resulted in a rejection of 
the null hypothesis. See Appendix D, for further test results.
Table 12 provides a further breakdown of the questions according to the mean 
and standard deviation by group
Table 12
Breakdown o f Responses by Groups
Variable Salaried Contract
(5) Aware of Mean 3.5 3.4
policy SD 0.96 0.52
(7) More Mean 3.9 1.8
information
SD 0.93 0.77
(9) Document Mean 3.4 2.3
classification
SD 1.0 0.70






Table 12 presents the means and standard deviation on the questions analyzed. 
On the rejected questions the mean was higher for the salaried employees. All were 
3.0 or higher, shifting toward agree while the contract employees were all below the
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mean, shifting toward disagree. These results would indicate that salary employees 
have a better understanding of the policy than contract employees.
Table 13 addresses hypothesis 4 which compares demographic question 23, 
time in current position, to the same set of survey questions used for hypothesis 1, 
hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3. The demographic groups consisted of technical 
employees N= 93 and non-technical N=96.
Table 13
Analysis o f Research Question 1 to Hypothesis 4
Variable Calculated r-Value Decision @ 95% P-Value
(5) Aware of policy 1.51 Retain 0.32
(7) More information 2.81 Reject 0.80
(9) Document classification 2.73 Reject 0.77
(15) More training 2.65 Reject 0.75
(19) Breach contact 2.18 Reject 0.58
Note: Population sample technical n -  93. non-technical n=96. Tabled r-value 1.98.
As shown in Table 13, the tabled r-value at 95% confidence is 1.98. Any 
calculated r-values higher than 1.98 resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis. As 
indicated in the table, survey questions 7, 9, 15, and 19 resulted in a rejection of the 
null hypothesis. The null for question 5 was retained. See Appendix D, for further 
test results.
Table 14 provides a further breakdown of the questions according to the mean 
and standard deviation by group.
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Table 14












classification SD 1.12 0.87
(15) Mean 3.3 2.9
More training
SD 1.14 1.06
(19) Mean 3.6 3.4
Breach contact
SD 0.83 0.67
Although Table 13 shows that rejection of the null hypothesis was found on 
survey questions 9, 15, and 19, Table 14 shows that on each one of the rejected 
questions the technical group means score were over the mean of 3.0, indicating 
agreement, while the non-technical group means were below 3.0, which shifted 
toward disagree by the group.
In summary, for hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 the 0-5 year group (group one) 
showed tendencies of being different from the other groups by disagreeing with 
regard to their overall understanding of the policy. For hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4 
it appears that contract employees and the non-technical employees differ from their 
counterparts, salary and technical, by shifting toward disagree with their 
understanding of the policy.
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Research question 2 investigated the level of value employees place on 
information security. As with research question 1, there were four hypothesis 
statements developed to determine if significant differences existed among the four 
demographic groups. The survey questions tested for these hypotheses were survey 
questions 4, 13, and 14, as illustrated in Table 15. These survey questions were 
compared against demographic question 20, length of service, in the development of 
hypothesis 5
Table 15
Analysis o f Research Question 2 to Hypothesis 5 
Length o f Service






Security 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.6 1.40 33.49 2 ,5 ,4 , 3
information 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.4 2.17 1 ,5 ,4 ,3
program 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.4 2.14 1,2
is important 4. 16-20 Yrs 4.4 2.95 1,2
5. 21+ Yrs 4.3 3.32 1,2
(13)
Less access 1. 0-5 Yrs 1.9 1.69 16.44 2, 5, 3, 4
for contract 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.8 2.62 1
employees 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.4 2.59 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.4 3.57 1
5. 21+ Yrs 3.2 4.02 1
(14)
Adequate 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.4 3.33 9.17 4 ,3
security 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.6 1.96 3
in my 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.3 1.93 1,2
dept. 4. 16-20 Yrs 3.2 2.66 1
5. 21+ Yrs 3.0 2.99
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Table 15 shows a calculated F-ratio higher than the tabled F-ratio of 2.42 
resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis on all three of the survey questions. 
Group one, which represents employees with 0-5 years of service consistently scored 
below the mean of 3.0 on all questions, whereas groups who have longer years in 
service generally scored above the mean indicating that groups with less time do not 
practice corporate guidelines related to information security as much as groups with 
longer length of service. See Appendix E for further test results.
Hypothesis 6 tested the same survey questions against demographic question 
21 (time in current position) using ANOVA, as the test indicates significant 
differences among the group on all questions. Table 16 provides test results of 
hypothesis 6.
Table 16
Analysis o f Research Question 2 to Hypothesis 6 
Time in Current Position





(4) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.0 1.44 11.26 2 ,4 ,3
Security information 2, 6-10 Yrs 3.7 2.45 1
program is important 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.3 2.77 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.2 5.37 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 10.75 1
(13) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.2 1.59 7.65 3
Less access for 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.8 2.72
contract employees 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.5 3.06 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.2 5.94
5. 21+ Yrs 4.0 11.89
(14) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.5 2.67 7.10 3,5
Adequate security. 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.9 1.92
in my dept 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.3 2.15 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.0 4.19
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 8.38 1
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Table 16 indicates once again that the 0-5 year group, time in current position, 
scored lower than the mean shifting toward disagree. Also group 2, which represents 
employees with 6-10 years in current position, scored below the mean on two of the 
three questions. As shown, the calculated F-ratio was higher than the tabled F-ratio 
of 2.42 on all questions analyzed. See Appendix E for further test results.
Hypothesis 7 compared demographic question 20, salaried employee and 
contract employees to survey questions 4, 13, and 14 to answer research question 2. 
This test consisted of using a two-sample r-test with a tabled r-value of 1.98 at 95% 
confidence, and showed a rejection on all three of the questions. See Table 17.
Table 17





@ 95% P -Value
(4) Security important 14.5 Reject 1.00
(13) Less access for contract 12.8 Reject 1.00
(14) Adequate security 4.64 Reject 0.99
Note: Population sample salaried n=103 contract n=86. Tabled r-value 1.98
As shown in Table 17, a rejection of the null hypothesis occurred on all three 
of the survey questions analyzed. This would indicate a difference on the question of 
practice between salary and contract. The calculated r-values were higher than the 
tabled r-value of 1.98 on all questions. Refer to Appendix E for detailed test results.
Table 18 presents a breakdown of salary and contract groups based on mean 
and standard deviation.
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Table 18
Breakdown o f Response by Groups
Variable Salaried Contract
(4) Security Mean 4.2 2.4
information is
important SD 0.87 0.79
(13) Less access Mean 3.4 1.6
for contract
employees SD 1.13 0.68
(14) Adequate Mean 3.0 2.4
security in my
dept. SD 0.99 0.69
Table 18 provides a further breakdown of the analysis with the salary group 
scoring over the mean, shifting toward agree on all questions, while the contract 
group scored below the mean on all questions, which shows a shift toward disagree.
The evaluation of hypothesis 8 for research question 2 also used a two-sample 
r-test for testing demographic question 23 (technical and non-technical) against the 
same three survey questions as shown in Table 19.
Table 19






(4) Security important 2.93 Reject 0.83
(13) Less access for contract 1.83 Retain 0.44
(14) Adequate security 1.86 Retain 0.45
Note: Population sample technical n=93 non-technical n - 96. Tabled r-value 1.98
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 19 illustrates an analysis of technical and non-technical employees. 
Question 4 had a calculated r-value of 2.93, which was slightly higher than the tabled 
value of 1.98, indicating a rejection of the null hypothesis for that question. See 
Appendix E for detailed test results.
Table 20 provides a further breakdown by mean and standard deviation to 
illustrate how the groups differed.
Table 20
Breakdown o f Responses by Groups
Variable Technical Non-Technical
(4) Security information Mean 3.7 3.2
is important SD 1.21 1.18
(13) Less access for Mean 2.8 2.4
contract employees SD 1.37 1.22
(14).Adequate security Mean 2.9 2.6
in my dept SD 1.02 0.78
The technical group had a slightly higher mean of 3.7 compared to the non­
technical mean of 3.2 with both groups shifting toward agree. The null hypothesis 
was retained on questions 13 and 14 with both groups scoring below the mean 
shifting toward disagree.
To summarize the findings relative to research question 2, it appears again 
that the group representing 0-5 years of service and time in current position value 
security less than the other groups. The group representing the contract employees
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valued security less compared to the salary employees. The results indicate that when 
comparing the two groups of technical and non-technical employees, there was a 
significant difference on question 4 with the technical group showing more agreement 
than the non-technical group. There were no statistically significant differences 
between the groups on the issue of less access for contract employees and for 
adequate security practices, with both groups moving toward disagree.
Research question 3 addresses the question of employees practicing of 
information security. For this question, hypotheses, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were 
developed. The survey questions used to answer this question and test the null 
hypothesis were survey questions 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, and 12. For hypothesis 9 and 
hypothesis 10 the Bonferroni Multiple Comparison ANOVA was used to test the 
hypothesis. The survey questions used were compared against demographic question 
20 (length of service) and demographic question 21 (time in current position). See 
Table 21.
Table 21
Analysis o f Research Question 3 to Hypothesis 9
Calculated Different
Variable Group X SD F-ratio from  eri
(1) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.7 11.81 11.90 3 ,4
Securing data 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.0 2.08 4
routinely 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.6 2.06 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.0 2.84 1,2
5. 21+ Yrs 3.3 3.20
(2) 1. 0-5 Yrs 4.4 8.69 4.21 2
Display ID 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.8 2.04 1
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.9 2.01
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.4 2.77
5. 21+ Yrs 3.8 3.11
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Table 21-Continued
(3) 1. 0-5 Yrs 1.7 1.52 25.49 2 ,5 ,4 , 3
Ask unknown 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.4 2.36 1 ,4 ,3
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.6 2.33 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.4 3.21 1,2
5. 21+ Yrs 2.9 3.62 1
(6) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.5 1.53 0.96
Check Handbags 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 2.39
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.5 2.34
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.8 3.24
5. 21+ Yrs 3.4 3.64
(8) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.5 1.25 6.18 3 ,4
Secure desk 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.7 1.93
when away 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.0 1.90 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.4 2.63 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.0 3.58
(10) 1. 0-5 Yrs 4.1 1.40 2.48
Password 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.6 2.17
not shared 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.7 2.12
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.0 2.94
5. 21+ Yrs 3.8 3.31
(11) 1. 0-5 Yrs 1.9 1.56 24.31 2, 3 ,4
Shred 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.6 2.43 1, 3,4
documents 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.6 2.40 1,5,
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.7 3.31 1 ,5 ,2
5. 21+ Yrs 2.5 3.72 3 ,4
(12) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.0 1.71 30.90 2, 5, 3 ,4
Lock desk/ 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.0 2.67 1 ,3 ,4
cabinets daily 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.2 2.63 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.3 3.62 1,2
5. 21+ Yrs 3.6 4.09 1
Differences were found between the groups analyzed, which addressed 
research question 3, practicing corporate guidelines related to information security, 
and hypothesis 9. Group 1 representing 0-5 years of service, shows tendencies
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toward disagreeing by scoring much lower than the mean on these questions, 
compared to the other groups. On questions where there were no significant 
differences, all groups scored above the mean with a shift toward disagree. See 
Appendix D for detailed results.
Table 22 presents findings of test results for hypothesis 10, which tested for 
differences between the groups based on time in current position as correlated to 
research question 3.
Table 22
Analysis o f Research Question 3 to Hypothesis 10 
Time in Current Position
Calculated Different 
V ariable Group X SD F-ra tio  from groups
(1) 1 . 0-5 Yrs 2.8 11.95 10.27 3
Securing data 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 2.03
routinely 2>. 11-15 Yrs 04 oo 2 29 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.0 4.45 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 8.90
(2) 1. 0-5 Yrs 4.0 11.92 0.68
Display ID 2. 6-10 Yrs 4.0 2.03
3 . 11-15 Yrs 4.2 T T9
4 . 16-20 Yrs 4.2 4.43
5 . 21 + Yrs 4.5 8.88
‘ (3) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.0 1.45 13.61 4.
Ask unknown 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.6 2.48 3
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.6 2.80 1,
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.5 5.44 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.0 10.88
(6) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.5 13.38 1.22
Check Handbags 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.4 2.28
3. 11-15 Yrs 3.4 2.56
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.2 4.98
5. 21+ Yrs 4.0 9.97
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Table 22 -  Continued
(8) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.5 11.11 4.50 4 ,5
Secure desk 2. 6-10 Yrs 4.0 1.89
when away 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.0 2.12
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.5 4.13 1
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 8.27 1
(10) 1. 0-5 Yrs 4.0 12.36 1.19
Passwords 2, 6-10 Yrs 3.7 2.10
not shared -s 11-15 Yrs 3.9 2.37
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.7 4.60
5. 21+ Yrs 5.0 9.20
(11) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.1 1.48 13.87 2,4.
Shred 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.8 2.54 1, 3
documents 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.6 2.85 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.6 5.53 1
5. 21+ Yrs 5.0 11.07 1
(12)Lock desk/ 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.5 1.73 12.03 3 ,4
cabinets 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 2.95 3
daily 3. 11-15 Yrs 4.1 3.32 1,2
4. 16-20 Yrs 4.2 6.44 1
5. 21+ Yrs 5.0 12.81
The table F value of 2.42 was compared against the calculated F value for 
each survey question to determine if significant differences were found. There were 
no significant differences for questions 6 and 10. On the questions that had 
differences, the 0-5 year group was predominately different compared to the rest of 
the groups ranging in the area of disagree. On survey questions 2, 6, and 10, the 0-5 
year group again scored below the mean compared to the groups, with results at or 
below the mean. See Appendix D for further detailed results.
Table 23 illustrates a two-sample t test, which was used to test for differences 
between the demographic groups of salary employees and contract employees against 
demographic question 22 (length of service).
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Table 23







Secure data routinely 4.99 Reject 0.99
(2)


















iNote: Population sample salaried n - 103, contract /i=86. TableH ?-vaiue 1.98.
Table 23 measures differences between salary and contract employees. All 
survey questions resulted in a rejection, with the calculated t-value higher than the 
table t-value of 1.98. The salary group scored higher than the contract group based 
on the mean of 3.0 on five of the eight questions, with the contract group scoring 
higher on three of the eight questions.
Table 24 presents a breakdown mean and standard deviation between the 
demographic groups, salary and contract employees, as related to research question 3.
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Table 24
Breakdown o f Responses by Groups
Variable Salaried Contract
(1) Secure data Mean 3.4 2.7




(3) Ask Mean 3.2 1.6
unknown SD 1.16 0.78
(6) Check Mean 3.3 3.7
Handbags SD 1.20 0.68
(8) Secure desk Mean 4.0 3.5
when away SD 1.0 0.62
(10) Passwords Mean 3.7 4.2








daily SD 1.0 0.89
The results indicate that the contract group does not practice key areas of the 
security policy relating to questions 1,3, 11, and 12. The contract group fell below 
the mean of 3.0, which indicates disagree. In regard to question 12, which addresses 
locking desk/cabinets daily, the contract group was in disagreement with this practice 
The results from the salary group indicate agreement with this practice. The fact that 
contract employees disagreed with this issue is troubling, due to the incidents of theft 
of personal items from desks that occur regularly.
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The testing of hypothesis 12 used the same two-sample r-test in evaluation of 
the same set of questions against demographic question 23, time in current position.
Table 25






(1) Secure data routinely 1.56 Retain 0.34
(2) Display ID -0.11 Retain 0.05
(3) Ask unknown 3.47 Reject 0.93
(6) Check Handbags 0.32 Retain 0.06
(8) Secure desk when away 1.09 Retain 0.19
(10) Passwords not shared -0.31 Retain 0.06
(11) Shred documents 2.75 Reject 0.78
(12) Lock desk/cabinets daily 2.81 Reject 0.79
Note: Population sample technical «=93 non-technical n=96. Tabled r-value 1.98
Table 25 shows that the null hypothesis was retained on six of the eight survey 
questions tested. The tabled r-value of 1.98 was higher than the calculated r-value for 
these questions. On questions 11 and 12, which were rejected, the technical group 
had a higher mean than the non-technical group.
Table 26 illustrates a breakdown of responses from the technical and non­
technical groups with addressing research question 3.
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Table 26
Breakdown o f Response by Groups
Variable Technical Non-Technical
(1) Secure data Mean 3.2 3.0




(3) Mean 2.8 2.2
Ask unknown SD 1.36 1.06
(6) Check Mean 3.5 3.5
Handbags SD 1.07 0.98
(8) Secure desk Mean 3.8 3.7
when away SD 0.93 0.83
(10) Passwords Mean 3.9 3.9
not shared SD 1.04 0.85
(11) Shred Mean 2.8 2.3




d a ily . SD 1.45 1.44
In summation of research question 3, the testing of the four hypotheses 
rejected that there were significant differences in the level of practice. The group 
representing 0-5 years of service and time in current position showed tendencies to 
disagree on the issue while the remaining groups with respect to length of service and 
time in current position moved toward agree. The salary group differed from the 
contract group, scoring higher toward agree while the contract group overall 
disagreed. Finally the technical and non-technical group retained the hypothesis on
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most questions and scored over the mean on those questions. While there were some 
differences between technical and non-technical, employees, these two groups were 
closer to be the same compared to the salary and contract groups.
Research question 4 addresses the issue of physical safety at work. Four 
hypothesis statements hypothesis 13, hypothesis 14 and hypothesis 15, and hypothesis 
16, were evaluated using survey questions 16, 17, and 18. hypothesis 13 tested the 
survey question against demographic question 20 (length of service) to determine if 
significant differences existed between groups.
Table 27
Analysis o f Research Question 4 to Hypothesis 13 
Length o f Service





(16) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.0 4.45 11.84 3
Feel safe 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.8 1.88 3
while at work 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.5 1.85 2, 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.5 2.54 2
5. 21+ Yrs 3.2 2.87
(17) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.2 6.91 7.32 5, 3
Aware of breach 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.9 2.01
in work area 3. 11-15 Yrs 2.5 1.99 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 2.7 2.73
5. 21+ Yrs 2.2 3.07 1
(18) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.2 4.42 2.20'
Aware of breach 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.4 1.97
out of area 3. 11-15 Yrs 2.6 1.95
4. 16-20 Yrs 2.7 2.69
5. 21+ Yrs 2.6 3.02
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Table 27 addresses research question 4, which asked if employees felt safe 
from physical harm while at work. On question 16, the calculated F-ratio of 4.45 was 
higher than the tabled value 2.42. Groups 1, 3, 4, and 5 scored over the mean. Group 
2, representing the employees’ length of service as 6-10 years, scored slightly under 
the mean. Although the calculated F-ratio was higher than the tabled value, there was 
little difference between the groups, all-averaging close to the targeted mean 
indicating neutral or no opinion. On question 17 the calculated F-ratio of 7.32 was 
again higher, indicating the rejection of the null hypothesis. The mean scores of the 
group ranged from 2.2 for group 5 on the low end, to 3.2 for group one on the high 
end. Question 18, which addressed a security breach outside of their work area, was 
retained with the calculated F-ratio of 2.20; lower then the tabled value of 2.42.
Table 28
Analysis o f  Research Question to Hypothesis 14 
Time in Current Position





(16) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.9 9.89 4.30 3
Feel safe while 2. 6-10 Yrs 3.2 1.79
at work 3. 11-15 Yrs 3.4 2.03 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 3.5 3.94
5. 21+ Yrs 4.5 7.90
(17) 1. 0-5 Yrs 3.0 9.08 2.58 3
Aware of breach 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.9 2.03
in work area 3. 11-15 Yrs 2.4 2.28 1
4. 16-20 Yrs 2.7 4.42
5. 21+ Yrs 2.5 8.,86
(16) 1. 0-5 Yrs 2.3 2.96 0.96
Aware of breach 2. 6-10 Yrs 2.5 1.92
out of work area 3. 11-15 Yrs 2.6 2.17
4. 16-20 Yrs 2.7 4.20
5. 21+ Yrs 2.5 8.40
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Table 28 represents time in current position group one representing 0-5 years 
scored just below the mean. The remainder of the groups scored over the mean on 
question 16. For question 17 the calculated F-value was slightly higher at 2.58 with 
group three having the lowest mean of 2.4 and group one with the highest of 3.0. 
Question 18 had an F-ratio of 0.96 lower than the table of 2.42, thus retaining the null 
hypothesis.
Demographic question 22, which was used to address hypothesis 15, tested for 
differences between salary employees and contract employees. A two-sample t-test 
was used to test this hypothesis. See Tables 29 and 30.
Table 29






(16) Feel safe 
while at work 0.74 Retain 0.11
(17) Security 
breach in area -6.38 Reject 0.99
(18) Security 
breach out area 3.23 Reject 0.89
Note: Population sample salaried n=103 contract n - 86 . Tabled r-value 1.98.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
Table 30
Breakdown o f Responses by Groups
Variable Salaried Contract
(16) Feel safe Mean 3.1 3.0
while at work
SD 1.05 0.47
(17) Aware of Mean 2.5 3.3
breach in
work area SD 0.97 0.64
(18) Aware of 




Table 30, which compared contract and salary employees on research question 
4, rejected on questions 17 and 18. On question 17 the contract group scored higher 
(3.3) while the salary group scored below the mean at 2.56. The rejection of the null 
for question 18 showed the salary group scoring slightly higher (2.63) than the 
contract group at 2.23.
Summary of research question 4 would indicate that while some differences 
were found, the demographic groups generally scored near or at neutral. This would 
indicate that the groups did not have strong opinions on this issue regarding physical 
safety.
The final hypothesis hypothesis 16 tested technical and non-technical 
employees, as with hypothesis 15 a two-sample /-test was administrated at the tabled 
/-value of 1.98 for 95% confidence level. See Table 31.
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Table 31






(16) Feel safe 
while at work 0.81 Retain 0.12
(17) Security 
breach in area 0.05 Retain 0.05
(18) Security 
breach out area 1.54 Retain 0.33
Note : Population sample technical n=93 non-technical n=96. Tabled t-value 1.98.
As illustrated in Table 31 all three questions were retained. All three null 
hypotheses indicate no significant differences between technical and non-technical 
employees surveyed. See Appendix E for further detailed test results. See Table 32.
Table 32
Breakdown o f Responses by Groups
Variable Technical Non-Technical
(16) Feel safe Mean 3.1 3.0
while at work SD 0.99 0.66
(17) Aware of 
breach in work
Mean 2.9 2.9
area SD 1.03 0.81
(18) Aware of 
breach out of work
Mean 2.5 2.3
area SD 0.96 0.75
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Conclusion
This chapter provided descriptive statistics as illustrated in the tables, as well 
as analysis of the 16 null hypotheses using Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) and Two- 
Sample r-Test. Chapter 5 provides a summary, background of the problem, along 
with a discussion of the findings, and further conclusions and recommendations.
Fifteen of the null hypotheses were rejected and 1 was retained. Hypothesis 
16, which stated that there were significant differences between technical and non­
technical employees with their regard to perception of safety, was retained. The 
overall results showed that there were significant differences between the 
demographic groups. Group one, which represented the employees with 0-5 years of 
service and time in current position generally, showed disagreement with regard to 
understanding, valuing, and practicing security. The contract employees consistently 
had lower mean scores “disagree” relative to the issues. The non-technical group 
slightly disagreed while the technical group agreed with the questions of 
understanding, value, and practice. Overall with regard to the question of safety, all 
groups averaged in the neutral area indicating no opinion on the subject.
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CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, FINDINGS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Sum m ary
The purpose of this study was to determine the level at which employees 
understand, value, and practice corporate guidelines that relate to information security 
at the XYZ Engineering Center. Additionally, the study sought to determine 
employee perception of physical safety while at work. It is hoped that the results of 
this study may be used by appropriate management as a means for determining if  a 
new or revised policy should be implemented.
Statement of the Problem
Due to an increase in global competition, the need for security within the 
industrial world is on the rise. The drive to be first to market with a product may 
motivate companies to do whatever it takes in order to gain an edge over the 
competition, including the theft o f proprietary information. Hacking, cheating, and 
stealing information for material gains are natural consequences in many companies 
and o f an economy that relies heavily on technology and the Internet (Winkler, 1997). 
Like many other companies, the XYZ Engineering Center, a division o f a multi-
103
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national corporation, faces an ever-increasing threat of industrial espionage and 
information theft by its competitors. In a recent letter to employees, Deborah 
Penninger, Manager of Global Security at XYZ Engineering Center, stated that XYZ 
recognizes that a potential exists for the increases of malicious code (viruses, worms) 
web defacement, or denial of service attacks, especially during times o f international 
uncertainly (Penninger, 2003). The letter further states that the impact o f a damaging 
malicious code into XYZ computing environment has the potential to disrupt 
telecommunications, deny access to applications, or provide unauthorized access to 
classified XYZ information. Finally, Penninger’s letter encourages employees to 
report any suspicious activity to the XYZ Security Department.
Overview of Literature
In reviewing the literature, history has shown that the protection of technology 
dates back to ancient Rome when the Celts stole secrets from the Romans for making 
superior chariot wheels and the Persians stole secrets from the Chinese for silk 
production (Carlton, 1992). Security in America became important during World 
War I for fear o f industrial espionage. With the start o f World War II the need for 
security continued to rise, and by the end o f the World War II over 200,000 men and 
woman were sworn in as security personnel (Green, 1989). With the end of the cold 
war, former government spies are now in the business o f corporate espionage.
Further review of the literature indicates a number o f studies and articles 
about information security. Experts in the field recognize the need for tighter security 
o f information due, in part, to increased global competition (Littlejohn, 2002). 
Heightened measures can be taken, such as the careful screening o f potential
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employees. To counter-act this threat, a pre-employment contract can spell out 
exactly what information is retained by the employer in an event o f the employee’s 
termination. Finally, creating an environment of open and honest communication 
with employees can assist the corporation in attaining the goals o f total information 
security. In the present environment and for the foreseeable future, security must be 
regarded as integral to the management process and to the continued viability of 
corporate operations (Cavanagh, 2002).
The process o f developing an effective information security policy should also 
be a top priority in an organization. The policy should define the objectives o f the 
organization and outline a strategy to obtain the stated objectives. A security team 
needs to inform and educate the employees of that organization about its security 
policies and procedures. Employees must realize that they are an integral part of 
information security process. This process is not easily executed and organizations 
must constantly strive to improve the process and provide the best defense against 
threats to the organization (Lee, 2001).
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is derived from Martin Fishbein’s 
Theory of Reasoned Action. Fishbein is one o f the best-known and respected 
information-integration theorists (Littlejohn, 2002). The theory holds that a person‘s 
behavioral intentions are a function of two different factors. The first factor is 
attitude toward the behavior, which Randall (1989) defined as the product of one’s 
salient belief that performing the behavior will lead to certain outcomes, and an 
evaluation o f the outcomes i.e., rating o f the desirability o f the outcome. The second
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factor is subjective norm, which is a function o f the product o f one’s normative belief 
which is the person’s belief that the salient referent thinks he should (or should not) 
perform the behavior, and his/her motivation to comply with that referent (Randall, 
1989).
This theory provides a framework to study attitudes toward behaviors. 
According to the theory, the most important determinant o f a person’s behavior is 
intent. The individual’s intention to perform a behavior is a combination o f attitude 
toward performing the behavior and subjective norm. The individual’s attitude 
toward the behavior includes: behavioral belief, evaluations o f behavioral outcome, 
subjective norm, normative beliefs, and the motivation to comply.
If a person perceives the outcome from performing a behavior is positive, 
he/she will have a positive attitude toward performing that behavior. The opposite 
can also be stated if  the behavior is thought to be negative. If relevant others see 
performing the behavior as positive and the individual is motivated to meet the 
expectations o f relevant others, then a positive subjective norm is expected. If 
relevant others see the behavior as negative, and the individual wants to meet the 
expectations o f these “others,” then the experience is likely to be a negative 
subjective norm for the individual (Cooper, 2001).
Methodology
To support the examination o f employees’ understanding, valuing, and 
practicing o f information security at XYZ Engineering Center as well as their feelings 
of safety at work, this study used a quantitative methodological approach. A self-
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administered questionnaire (Appendix A) was distributed to salaried and contract 
employees in order to answer the following research questions:
Question 1: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center understand the 
information security guidelines, as set forth by the corporation?
Question 2: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center value information 
security?
Question 3: Do the employees at the XYZ Engineering Center practice 
corporate guidelines related to information security?
Question 4: Do employees at XYZ Engineering Center feel safe from any 
physical harm while at work?
1. This study sought to determine if  there was a difference in employee 
understanding, valuing, and practicing o f information security based on their length 
of service, time in current position, salaried or contract employees’ status, and their 
technical or non-technical employee status.
2. In addition it examined employee’s feelings o f safety at the workplace.
The population sample for the investigation consisted of 189 respondents who
were contract and salaried employees. The descriptive statistics used in the study 
included frequency counts, percentages, means, and standard deviations. A two- 
sample t-test and ANOVA were used to evaluate the hypotheses. Tables are 
presented to display the results o f the analysis o f the question variables and 
demographic information.
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Findings
There were a total of 16 null hypotheses tested, which were based on length of 
service, time in current position, salaried or contract employee status, and technical or 
non-technical employee status. O f the hypotheses tested, 15 were rejected and 1 was 
retained. The following is a brief summary of the findings. Further analysis o f the 
hypotheses will occur in the discussion section.
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
information security guidelines based on length o f service.
This hypothesis showed significant differences among the groups. Those 
employees who have been with the company for 5 years or less, reported less 
understanding o f the information security policy than the remaining groups.
Hypothesis 2: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
information security guidelines based on time in current position.
Employees with 5 years or less time in current position again, reported less 
understanding o f information security than any other groups.
Hypothesis 3: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
information security guidelines based on salary employee or contract employee 
status.
The salaried group of employees presented a better understanding of 
information security than the contract employees.
Hypothesis 4: There is no significant difference in employee understanding of 
information security guidelines based on technical employee or non-technical 
employee status.
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The results o f this test showed a rejection of the null hypothesis. The technical 
group displayed understanding, while the non-technical group reported a lack of 
understanding.
Hypothesis 5: There is no significant difference in employees’ value of 
information security based on length of service.
This hypothesis was rejected. Employees with 10 years or less were 
significantly different from the remaining groups. This group rated the value of 
information security lower than the other three groups.
Hypothesis 6: There is no significant difference in employee value of 
information security based on time in current position.
This hypothesis was rejected. Employees who have been with the company 10 
years or less again were significantly different from the remaining groups. Once 
again, this group rated the value of information security lower than the other groups.
Hypothesis 7: There is no significant difference in employee value of 
information security based on salary or contract employment status.
Significant differences were found between the two groups. The salaried group 
rated the value o f information security much higher than their contract counterparts.
Hypothesis 8: There is no significant difference in employee value of 
information security based on technical employee or non-technical employee status.
The technical group showed a slightly higher degree o f value than the non­
technical group.
Hypothesis 9: There is no significant difference in employee practice of 
information security guidelines based on length o f service.
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Hypothesis 9 addresses research question 3, addressing the practice o f corporate 
guidelines related to information security based on length of service. Employees with 
less than 5 years o f service showed a significant difference from the rest of the 
groups.
Hypothesis 10: There is no significant difference in employee practice of 
information security guidelines based on time in current position.
Employees with less than 10 years in their current positions showed significant 
differences than the remaining group, indicating a lack of practice toward information 
security.
Hypothesis 11: There is no significant difference in employee practice of 
information security guidelines based on salary employee or contract employee 
status.
The results indicated that salaried employees practice information security more 
than the contract employees.
Hypothesis 12: There is no significant difference in employee practice of 
information security guidelines based on technical employee or non-technical 
employee status.
The technical group held slightly higher opinions with regard to their opinions 
on the issue of practice. The non-technical group had a slightly lower opinion 
regarding this question.
Hypothesis 13: There is no significant difference in employee perception of 
safety based on length o f service.
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Significant differences were found between groups. The 0-5 year group and the 
11-15 year group were similar. Both of these groups indicated a perception o f feeling 
unsafe while at work, which was different from the other groups’ perception o f their 
safety.
Hypothesis 14: There is no significant difference in employee perception of 
safety based on time in current position.
Once again analysis revealed similar results with differences found in both the 
0-5 year and 11-15 year groups. Both groups displayed a perception o f not feeling 
safe in the workplace.
Hypothesis 15: There is no significant difference in employee perception of 
safety based salaried employees vs. contract employees.
The data revealed that contract employees felt less safe than the salaried 
employees while at work.
Hypothesis 16: There is no significant difference in employee perception of 
safety based on technical or non-technical employee status.
There were no differences in the perception o f safety among technical and non­
technical employees.
In summary the analysis o f the hypothesis revealed that employees who have 
been with the company 5 years or less had less understanding, practiced less, and 
valued information security less than the groups. In addition, the research revealed 
that contract employees understand, practice, and value information security less then 
salaried employees. Further the research found non-technical employees understand, 
practice, and value information security less then the technical employees. Finally
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with regard to the issue of safety, the research revealed those employees with 0-5 
years and 11-16 years o f service felt less safe than those employees who had 6-10 
years or over 16 years o f service. Additionally the research revealed that contract 
employees felt less safe then salaried employees, and no differences were found 
among the technical and non-technical group, with both groups having no opinion 
regarding this issue.
Discussion
The results o f this study proved to be somewhat different from what the 
researchers’ own personal beliefs were. The results, which showed that contract 
employees were less concerned about security than salaried employees, came as no 
surprise. Contract employees are not “real” XYZ Engineering Center employees, 
therefore they do not share the same level of status that XYZ Engineering Center 
employees get. For example contract employees receive less pay and benefits and 
have far less job security than salaried employees, yet often times they have the same 
level of responsibility. This environment often creates animosity within the 
organization, which could be another reason why contract employees rated lower on 
this issue. Further analysis of the contract employees produced some alarming 
numbers. There were 86 contract employees who took part in the survey compared to 
103 salary employees. Survey question 7, which addresses security, showed that 78 
o f the 86 either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the question. There were 62 
contract employees who did not understand the XYZ policy on document 
classification. There were 68 of the 86 who would not be willing to attend a 
workshop on information security. In contrast to this, 81 o f the 86 disagreed with the
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notion that contract employees should have less access to classified information.
These results would suggest that contract employees feel that they should be treated 
the same with respect to access to classified information, yet based on results o f the 
survey questions which addressed these issues, they are not interested in more 
information and training. As stated in chapter 2, contract employees are here to stay 
(Norris, 2000). Norris goes on to say that steps can be taken to ensure companies are 
getting quality contract help. The human resource department should play a closer 
role in scrutinizing staffing companies and understanding their policies for recruiting 
such as assuring that criminal and educational background checks are done before a 
contract worker is sent on a job interview (Lachnit, 2002). Finally high performing 
contract workers should be rewarded with more vacation time, benefits, and paid-time 
off to ensure continued performance at high levels (Norris, 2000).
When doing the analysis o f variance the researcher discovered that employees 
who had 5 years or less o f service understand, practice, and value information 
security compared to the other groups. These results could indicate that there is a 
training issue with this group.
The fact that a majority o f the contract population has 0-5 years of service 
may have contributed to group one having significant differences from the rest of the 
groups. This should be a concern to XYZ Management, due to the fact that the 
contract population is growing. For apparent cost savings reasons, the company 
continues to hire contract workers. The results o f this research show that contract 
employees are less concerned about security. Fifty-six o f the contract employees felt 
that a strong information security program was not important to the survival o f XYZ
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Engineering. The fact that this group o f people is operating in an environment with 
access to classified information should be alarming to the leadership o f this 
organization. Late last year, automakers and suppliers forced contract labor 
companies to reduce their fees by 7%. Many contract labor companies passed along 
the fee cuts to their employees by reducing paychecks, some up to 15%, and cutting 
vacation according to workers (Miller, 2003). When encouraged by improving sales, 
a large manufacturing company who employ many contract workers granted merit- 
pay raises to its salaried employees. Many contract workers at this company felt 
angry and slighted (Miller, 2003). The Detroit News, while declining to comment 
publicly, contacted several contract workers from this company and wondered why 
this company would not restore their pay to where it was a year ago if  the company 
finances were improving. These types o f decisions could possibly create even a 
larger gap between contract and salary workers. Since companies are not responsible 
for paying their benefits, contract workers provide a cheaper source of labor during 
good times and an easy cost-cutting target when times are tough. Contract 
employees, placed in this type of an environment comes as no surprise that their 
ratings o f information security were much lower than their salary counter parts. In a 
recent Time/CNN poll, 73% of working adults surveyed said that they would report a 
wrongdoing at work if they observed one (Morse, 2002). Based on the results of this 
research, it would be interesting to know how many of those surveyed were contract 
employees.
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Conclusion
This research was done to determine employees’ understanding, valuing, and 
practicing information security at XYZ Engineering Center. Surveys were used to 
collect data and statistical analysis done to answer the research questions. After 
completing this study the data revealed that employees with less than 5 years with the 
company understand, value, and practice information security less than employees 
with more time. In addition the data revealed that contract employees understand, 
value, and practice information security less than salaried employees. These findings 
should be a concern to XYZ Engineering based on the large number o f employees 
with less than 5 years and a high number o f contract employees employed at XYZ 
Engineering Center.
There were 16 hypotheses tested to answer this question. All were based on the 
aforementioned demographics. Fifteen o f the 16 were rejected. This would clearly 
indicate that significant differences in the understanding, practice, and perception of 
information security do occur between the various demographic groups.
The analysis of the survey provided a variety o f information relative to the 
opinions of employees regarding information security. The response rate o f 47% 
shows that employees are interested in expressing opinions regarding the subject of 
information security. Although the employees with less than 5 years o f service and 
contract employees disagreed on the research questions, their participation in this 
study showed that they do have interest in voicing their opinions. The 21st century 
finds companies facing more global competition. Information is the lifeline o f any 
organization and must be protected if  a company expects to survive. In addition to
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this, with terrorism on the rise, it is even more important that companies remain 
vigilant of threats that could be carried out which would cause economic chaos. 
Having a comprehensive security policy in place that is understood and practiced by 
all employees will help to ensure the survival o f the XYZ Engineering Center. With 
the implementation o f the recommendations, XYZ will be in position of survival 
moving forward into the 21st century.
Recommendations
The following recommendations were developed as a result o f  this project and 
will be presented to management for its review:
Recommendation 1: Develop a comprehensive training program for newly 
hired employees that provides an understanding o f expectations the corporation has of 
employees with regard to information security. Since this study has showed that 
employees with 5 years or less service consistently scored lower in areas that address 
information security, providing these employees with extensive training early in their 
careers may serve to acclimate them to the importance of practicing information 
security.
Recommendation 2: Develop an ongoing program of information security that 
will be permanent and continuous for employees at all levels. Develop a program 
such as a telephone line and/or a company web site as a means for employees to 
obtain answers to concerns or questions about security issues. In addition, implement 
a telephone line that could also be used as a tool to report, anonymously, suspicious 
activities or to report employees who are suspected o f violating information security 
practices.
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Recommendation 3: A review by management o f the access level contract 
employees have to classified and sensitive data and evaluate the need for contract 
employees in sensitive positions. This would require a through review by 
management o f contract employee’s job responsibilities and efforts made to limit 
their access to information that could be used by the competition. These results 
would indicate that while contract employees understand the policy, they do not 
practice all aspects o f the policy. Overall results indicated that salary employees are 
more likely to practice information security process while contract employees are not.
Recommendation 4: Provide training that will help employees understand what 
to do in the event o f an emergency such as a situation that would place an employee 
at a safety risk. Even though the employees had a neutral position or agreed that they 
felt safe, the XYZ Engineering Center still has responsibility for keeping employees 
safe while at work. Therefore the company should continue to evaluate its safety and 
emergency policies.
Recommendations for Further Research
Recommendation 1: It is recommended that the corporate security staff conduct 
a similar study for the entire XYZ Corporation. This study was conducted in one area 
o f a large corporation. The findings from this research can be used as a basis for 
XYZ to gage employee understanding and practices of information security. For this 
corporation to continue to be successful, it must be assured that all employees 
understand and practice information security.
Recommendation 2: It is further recommended that a study similar to this one 
be conducted globally at XYZ Corporation. As a multi-national company, XYZ has
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operations located in several countries. These locations may also have a need for 
information security protection. Conducting this study on a global level will assist 
XYZ with identifying and understanding if  any differences from a cultural standpoint 
exist.
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Dear Participant:
My name is Dale Mancini and I am a doctoral student at Andrews University. As part of 
my research, I am examining the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that participants hold 
regarding the information and product security program at the company and to determine 
the effectiveness of the current program. I am inviting you to participate in this research 
study by completing the attached survey.
The following survey will require approximately 15 minutes or less to complete. There is 
no compensation for responding, nor is there any known risk. In order to insure that all 
information will remain confidential, please do not include your name. Copies of the 
project will be provided to my Andrews University advisor as well as the management of 
the company. If you choose to participate in this project, please answer all questions as 
honestly as possible and return the completed questionnaire promptly in the inter-office 
envelope provided. Participation is strictly voluntary and you many refuse to participate 
at any time.
Thank-you for taking the time to assist me in my educational endeavors. The data 
collected will provide useful information regarding attitudes about information and 
product security, and hopefully reinforce or improve the current program. Completion 
and return of the questionnaire form will indicate your willingness to participate in this 
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INFORMATION SECURITY SURVEY
Please circle your appropriate response by using the following criteria: 1 Strongly Disagree; 2 Disagree; 
3 Neutral; 4 Agree; 5 Strongly Agree.
Strongly 
Disagree
1. Securing sensitive data - such as 
computer disks, prints, drawings and  ̂
pictures - when not in use, is a practice that 
is done on a routine basis.
2. While at work, I display my company  ̂
identification at all times.
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Agree
2 3 4 5
3. If an unknown or unauthorized person
appears in my work area, I ask him or her 1 2 3 4 5
to state the nature of his or her business.
4. I feel that a strong information security  ̂
program is important to the survival of XYZ.
5. I understand the XYZ policy pertaining to  ̂
information security.
6. When exiting the building where a
security officer is located, I am asked to 1
open my brief case, lunch box, or handbag 
for inspection.
7. I would like more information from 
management on how I can become more 1 
aware of information security.
. 8. When away from my desk, I make sure ^
that valuables are secured.
9. I understand the XYZ policy on document 
classification. For example, I understand 1 
the difference between XYZ Secret and XYZ 
Confidential.
10. Computer passwords are not shared  ̂
among employees in my work group.
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 - 3  4 5




11.1 routinely shred documents of a 
classified nature when the documents are 
no longer needed.
12.1 lock my file cabinets when leaving 
work for the day.
13. Contract employees should be given less 
access to classified information.
14.1 feel the department that I am currently 
working in has adequate information 
security practices.
15.1 would be willing to attend a class or 
workshop in order to be better trained 
regarding what the corporation expects from 
me in the area of information security.
16.1 feel safe from physical harm while at 
work.
17.1 am aware of specific instances where 
there was a breach of security in my work 
area.
18.1 am aware of instances of security 
breaches outside of my work area.
19. In the event of a security breach, I 
know who to contact.
Strongly
Agree
20. My length of service with XYZ 0-5 Yrs. 6-10 Yrs. 11-15 Yrs. 16-20 Yrs. 21+ Yrs.
21. My time in my current position. 0-5 Yrs. 6-10 Yrs. 11-15 Yrs. 16-20 Yrs. 21+ Yrs.
22. Please check one: XYZ Salaried Contract Employee
23. Please check one:  Management   Technical   Non-Technical
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR Q1 TO Q19
SUMMARY OF 189 FORMS
(1) Q01 Securing is routine
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
8.5%; 16 Strongly Agree 21.2%; 40 Disagree
28.0%; 53 Agree 4.8% 9 Strongly Disagree
37.6%; 71 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.86; Median 3.14; Std Dev 1.00; 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00





76 Strongly Agree 3.2%; 6  Disagree
85 Agree 2.6%; 5 Strongly Disagree
17 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189: Mean 1.83; Median 4.28; Std Dev 0.91; 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(3) Q03 Ask unknown business
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
5.8%; 11 Strongly Agree 32.3%; 61 Disagree
23.8%; 45 Agree 25.4%; 48 Strongly Disagree
12.7%; 24 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.48; Median 2.26; Std Dev 1.26; 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(4) Q04 Strong security good
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
27.5%; 52 Strongly Agree 31.2%; 59 Disagree
24.3%; 46 Agree - 1.1%; 2 Strongly Disagree
15.9; 30 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.54; Median 3.58; Std Dev 1.22 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
(5) QOS Aware of XYZ policies
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
7.9%; 15 Strongly Agree 6.3%; 12 Disagree
45.0%; 85 Agree 1.6%: 3 Strongly Disagree
39.2%: 74 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.49; Median 3.56; Std Dev 0.80 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(6 ) Q06 Asked to open
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
9.0%; 17 Strongly Agree 10.6%; 20 Disagree
58.7%; 111 Agree 6.9%; 13 Strongly Disagree
14.8%; 28 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.48; Median 3.80; Std Dev 1.03 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(7) Q07 More info management
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
18.5%; 35 Strongly Agree 29.1%; 55 Disagree
24.3%; 46 Agree 16.4%; 31 Strongly Disagree
11.6%; 22 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.01 Median 2.89; Std Dev 1.39 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(8 ) Q08 Desk secure when away
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
21.2%; 40 Strongly Agree 5.8%; 11 Disagree
43.4%; 82 Agree 1.1%; 2 Strongly Disagree
28.6%; 54 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.22; Median 3.84; Std Dev 0.88; 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(9) Q09 Secret/classified
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
7.4%; 14 Strongly Agree 42.3%; 80 Disagree
26.5%; 50 Agree 1.6%; 3 Strongly Disagree
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22.2%; 42 Neutral 
Statistic; Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.04; Median 2.77; Std Dev 1.03 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(10) Q10 Passwords not shared
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
8.5%; 16 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.03; Median 4.09; Std Dev 0.95 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(11) Q ll  Shred when not needed
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
10.1%; 19 Strongly Agree 35.4%; 67 Disagree
20.1%; 38 Agree 20.6%; 39 Strongly Disagree
13.8%; 26 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.37; Median 2.33; Std Dev 1.29 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(12) Q12 Lock desk/files daily
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
23.3%; 44 Strongly Agree 31.7%; 60 Disagree
22.2%: 42 Agree 17.5%: 33 Strongly Disagree
5.3%:10 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; xMean 2.98; Median 2.65; Std Dev 1.48 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(13) Q13 Less access contract
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
14.3%; 27 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.37; Median 2.31: Std Dev 1.31 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
28.0% ; 53 Strongly Agree 
53.4%; 101 Agree
7.4%; 14 Disagree 
2.6%; 5 Strongly Disagree
11.6%; 22 Strongly Agree 
17.5%; 33 Agree
35.4%; 67 Disagree 
21.2%; 40 Strongly Disagree
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(14) Q14 Dept adequate secure
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
2.1%; 4 Strongly Agree 37.6%; 71 Disagree
22.8%; 43 Agree 4.8%; 9 Strongly Disagree
32.8%; 62 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.20; Median 2.73; Std Dev 0.92 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(15) Q15 Willing attend class
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
13.8%; 26 Strongly Agree 42.3%; 80 Disagree
27.5%; 52 Agree 0.5%; 1 Strongly Disagree
15.9%; 30 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.88; Median 2.95; Std Dev 1.12 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(16) Q16 Feel safe
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
5.8% ; 11 Strongly Agree 10.6%; 20 Disagree
21.7%; 41 Agree 4.2%; 8  Strongly Disagree
57.7%: 109 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.86; Median 3.11; Std Dev 0.84 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(17) Q17 Aware breech security
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
1.6%; 3 Strongly Agree 24.9%; 47 Disagree
27.5%; 52 Agree 6.9%; 13 Strongly Disagree
39.2%; 74 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.08; Median 2.97; Std Dev 0.93 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(18) Q18 Aware incidents other
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
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2.1%; 4 Strongly Agree 55.6%; 105 Disagree
1 1 . 1 %; 21 Agree 7.4%; 14 Strongly Disagree
23.8%; 45 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 3.55; Median 2.27; Std Dev 0.87 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
(19) Q19 Know who to contact
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
4.8% ; 9 Strongly Agree 5.8%; 11 Disagree
58.2%; 110 Agree 2.1%; 4 Strongly Disagree
29.1%; 55 Neutral
Statistic: Replies 189; Forms 189; Mean 2.42; Median 3.72; Std Dev 0.77 
Minimum 1.00; Maximum 5.00
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DESREPTIVE STATISTICS FOR Q20 TO Q23
SUMMARY OF 189 FORMS
(20) Q20 Length of service
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
44.4%; 84 0-5Yrs. 10.1%; 19 16-20Yrs
18.5%; 35 6 -10Yrs 7.9%; 15 2 1 + Yrs
19.0%; 36 1 l-15Yrs
Statistics: Replies 189; Forms 189
(21) Q21 Time in current position
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
58,7%; 111 0-5Yrs. 4,2%; 8  16-20Yrs
20.1%; 38 6 -10Yrs 1.1%; 2 21+ Yrs
15.9%; 30 ll-15Y rs
Statistics: Replies 189; Forms 189
(22) Q22 Employment status
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
54.5%; 103 XYZ Salaried 45.5%; 8 6  Contract Employee
Statistics: Replies 189; Forms 189
(23) Q23 Position
Frequencies (Percents; Counts):
7.9% ; 15 Management 41.3% ; 78 Technical
50.8% ; 96 Non-Techincal
Statistics: Replies 189; Forms 189
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ANOVA REPORTS
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q01
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q21 4 34.52669 8.631672 10.27 0.000000* 0.999830
S 184 154.6162 0.8403053
Total (Adjusted) 188 189.1429
Total 189





1.00-1 ,------------ ,----------- ,----------- ,----------r
1 2 3 4 5
Q21




Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.837838 3,4
2 38 3.236842
3 30 3.833333 1
4 8 4 1
5 2 4.5
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Response Q04
Analysis of Variance Report
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio
A: Q21 4 55.26144 13.81536 11.26
S 184 225.6909 1.226581
Total (Adjusted) 188 280.9524
Total 189
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05
Prob
Level




2 3 4 5
Q21
Bonferroni (All-Pairwise) Multiple Comparison Test
Response: Q04 
Term A: Q21
Alpha=0.050 Error Term=S DF=184 MSE=1.226581 Critical Value=2.8413
Different From
Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 3.036036 2, 4, 3
2 38 3.763158 1
4 8 4.25 1
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response QOS
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q21 4 6.097349 1.524337 2.48 0.045569*
S 184 113.1196 0.6147804
Total (Adjusted) 188 119.2169
Total 189























Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of
Term DF Squares
A: Q21 4 13.06757
S 184 133.5991
Total (Adjusted) 188 146.6667
Total 189
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05















Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 3.576576 4
2 38 4
3 30 4
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q09
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q21 4 43.08571 10.77143 12.82 0.000000*
S 184 154.5757 0.8400851
Total (Adjusted) 188 197.6614
Total 189










Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.603604 2, 3, 4, 5
2 38 3.131579 1
3 30 3.7 1
4 8 3.875 1
5 2 4.5 1
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q10
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q21 4 4.271212 1.067803 1.19 0.318067
S 184 165.5383 0.8996648
Total (Adjusted) 188 169.8095
Total 189







1 2  3 4 5
Q21













Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q11
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio
A: Q21 4 72.2303 18.05758 13.87
S 184 239.5792 1.302061
Total (Adjusted) 188 311.8095
Total 189








2 3 4 5
Q21




Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.189189 2, 4, 3, 5
2 38 2.815789 1,3
4 8 3.625 1
3 30 3.633333 1,2
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q12
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A:Q21 4 84.99325 21.24831 12.03 0.000000* 0.999978
S 184 324.9221 1.765881
Total (Adjusted) 188 409.9153
Total 189




1.004------------- ■--------------- ,------------- 1------------- ■------------r-
1 2 3 4 5
Q21




Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.531532 3, 4
2 38 3.210526 3
3 30 4.133333 1,2
4 8 4.25 1
5 2 5
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q13
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q21 4 45.94012 11.48503 7.65 0.000010*
S 184 276.1339 1.500728
Total (Adjusted) 188 322.0741
Total 189




r -  3.00-
3
Q21




Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.261261 3
2 38 2.815789
4 8 3.25
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q14
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q21 4 21.18672 5.29668 7.10 0.000024’
S 184 137.1731 0.7455058
Total (Adjusted) 188 158.3598
Total 189










Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.567568 3, 5
2 38 2.921053
4 8 3
3 30 3.333333 1
5 2 4.5 1
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Response Q15
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of
Term DF Squares
A: Q21 4 56.83879
S 184 180.6004
Total (Adjusted) 188 237.4391
Total 189
* Term significant at alpha = 0.05














Group Count Mean Groups
1 111 2.684685 2, 4, 3
2 38 3.447368 1
5 2 3.5
4 8 3.875 1
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q01
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 38.86136 9.715341 11.90 0.000000* 0.999974
S 184 150.2815 0.8167472
Total (Adjusted) 188 189.1429
Total 189





1 0 0 - i-------------------1-------------------- ,------------------- ,------------------,----------------- r
1 2 3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.726191 3, 4
2 35 3.085714 4
5 15 3.333333
3 36 3.611111 1
4 19 4.052631 1,2
143
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q04
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 118.3676 29.59191 33.49 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 162.5847 0.8836128
Total (Adjusted) 188 280.9524
Total 189





1 .0 Q - I - ---------------- ,------------------ ,-------------1—
1 2 3
Q2Q




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.654762 2, 5, 4, 3
2 35 3.485714 1, 5, 4, 3
5 15 4.333333 1,2
4 19 4.421052 1.2
3 36 4.444445 1.2
144
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q05
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 14.8021 3.700526 6.52 0.000063* 0.990437
S 184 104.4148 0.5674719
Total (Adjusted) 188 119.2169
Total 189






1 .00-1-------------------■-------------------- .------------------- ,------------------ ,----------------- r
1 2 3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
2 35 3.142857 3, 5, 4
1 84 3.380952 4
3 36 3.805556 2
5 15 3.866667 2
4 19 3.947368 2, 1
145
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q08
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio
A: Q20 4 17.37715 4.344288 6.18
S 184 129.2895 0.7026604
Total (Adjusted) 188 146.6667
Total 189













Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 3.5 3,4
2 35 3.742857
5 15 4
3 36 4.027778 1
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q09
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (A!pha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 64.84304 16.21076 22.46 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 132.8183 0.7218388
Total (Adjusted) 188 197.6614
Total 189






1 .00-1  ,-------------------- ,-------------------,-------------------1-----------------r-
1 2 3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.392857 2, 5, 4, 3
2 35 2.885714 1, 4, 3
5 15 3.333333 1
4 19 3.736842 1,2
3 36 3.777778 1,2
147
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q10
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level
A: Q20 4 8.699457 2.174864 2.48 0.045254*
S 184 161.1101 0.8755982
Total (Adjusted) 188 169.8095
Total 189























Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q11
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 107.8223 26.95557 24.31 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 203.9873 1.108626
Total (Adjusted) 188 311.8095
Total 189










Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 1.928571 2, 3, 4
5 15 2.533333 3, 4
2 35 2.657143 1, 3, 4
3 36 3.694444 1, 5, 2
4 19 3.789474 1,5,2
149
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q12
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 164.7006 41.17516 30.90 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 245.2147 1.332689
Total (Adjusted) 188 409.9153
Total 189




1 00-j------ ,------ ,------ ,------ ,------ r-
1 2  3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.095238 2, 5, 3, 4
2 35 3 1, 3, 4
5 15 3.666667 1
3 36 4.222222 1,2
4 19 4.368421 1.2
150
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q13
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 84.79913 21.19978 16.44 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 237.2749 1.289538
Total (Adjusted) 188 322.0741
Total 189





1.00-1------------- •---------------,------------- «------------- ■------------r-
1 2 3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 1.916667 2, 5, 3, 4
2 35 2.828571 1
5 15 3.2 1
3 36 3.416667 1
4 19 3.473684 1
151
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q14
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 26.31288 6.57822 9.17 0.000001* 0.999411
S 184 132.0469 0.7176462
Total (Adjusted) 188 158.3598
Total 189






1 0CH------------- ,------------- 1------------- ,------------- 1------------- r-
1 2  3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.476191 4, 3
2 35 2.628572 3
5 15 3.066667
4 19 3.263158 1
3 36 3.361111 1,2
152
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Analysis of Variance Report
Response Q15
Analysis of Variance Table
Source Sum of Mean Prob Power
Term DF Squares Square F-Ratio Level (Alpha=0.05)
A: Q20 4 95.91718 23.9793 31.18 0.000000* 1.000000
S 184 141.522 0.7691411
Total (Adjusted) 188 237.4391
Total 189





1.004------------- ,--------------- ,-------------,------------- ,------------ r-
1 2 3 4 5
Q20




Group Count Mean Groups
1 84 2.380952 2, 5, 4, 3
2 35 3.314286 1, 4, 3
5 15 3.333333 1
4 19 4.052631 1,2
3 36 4.055555 1,2
153
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APPENDIX D 
TWO SAMPLE r-TEST REPORTS



















Difference <> 0 
Difference < 0 
Difference > 0








0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.000000 













0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.000000





0  0 4 -
1.0 2.0 3.0 4 0 5.0








0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.000000



















Difference <> 0 0.7581 0.449346
Difference < 0 0.7581 0.775327


























0 . 0 4 -



































Difference <> 0 17.2727 0.000000
Difference < 0 17.2727 1.000000






































0 . 0 - i -
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0
Q22=2



















Difference <> 0 
Difference < 0 
Difference > 0








0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1.000000 
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Difference <> 0 
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0.988843
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Variable Q15
161



















Difference <> 0 
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Difference <> 0 2.9369 0.003731
Difference < 0 2.9369 0.998134
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Difference <> 0 2.8169 0.005370
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Difference <> 0 1.8395 0.067421
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Difference <> 0 2.6536 0.008650
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